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This human rights report documents and analyzes instances in which the 
Massachusetts family courts are violating internationally accepted human 
rights laws and standards.  The report focuses specifically on cases 
involving child custody and visitation issues where there is a history of 
partner abuse.  In the vast majority of examples discussed in the report, the 
family courts also are violating Massachusetts law and policy….Our 
findings are based primarily on the in-depth testimonies of 40 battered 
mothers who experienced family court litigation in 11 of the 14 counties in 
Massachusetts.1
1 Carrie Cuthbert et al., BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS iv (2002) (hereinafter BATTERED MOTHERS 
SPEAK OUT).
2
On November 25, 2002, the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project of the 
Wellesley Centers for Women released Battered Mothers Speak Out: A Human Rights 
Report on Domestic Violence and Child Custody in the Massachusetts Family Courts.  
The report told the stories of forty battered mothers who had been involved in litigation 
in the Massachusetts family courts and argued that these courts had violated the human 
rights of battered mothers and their children.2  Specifically, the report argued that 
Massachusetts’ family courts had committed 
six distinct human rights violations: 
I. Failure to protect battered women and children from abuse 
II. Discrimination and bias against battered women
III. Degrading treatment of battered women
IV. Denial of due process to battered women
V. Allowing the batterer to continue the abuse through the family 
courts
VI. Failure to respect the economic rights of battered women and 
children.3
While battered women’s advocates applauded the study and mainstream media 
outlets in Massachusetts noted that “…if only a fraction of what these women say is true, 
it’s bad news for Massachusetts,”4 the official response from the court system was 
discouraging.5  Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Courts Sean M. 
Dunphy stated that the study’s “methodology is flawed,” because “the study relied on 
testimony only from women with complaints about custody decisions and not from those 
2 Id. at 14.  To be included in the study, a woman had to:  be a mother; have experienced violence from an 
intimate partner with whom she had children and with whom she no longer resided; have engaged in custody 
litigation with that former partner in the Massachusetts family courts; express grievances about family court 
processes and/or actors and/or perceive that her human rights might have been violated by family court actors; 
and be willing to speak with a documenter.  Id. at 6.
3 Id.
4 Witnesses to Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2002, at A-18.
5   Privately, however, some judges expressed concern about the points raised by the courts.  One judge asked 
one of the authors what she should do to change her court; other judges circulated “what do we do now?” 
memos.  Mark F. Massoud, The Influence of International Law on Local Social Movements 26 (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author).
3
satisfied with rulings.”6 While Dunphy said he respected the report, he suggested that the 
women’s accounts of their experiences did not justify the report’s conclusions, believing 
that “the women’s testimony would have been strengthened if it were verified by 
thorough review of court records and interviews with lawyers in the cases.”7
Although it initially generated a great deal of attention, the report of the Battered 
Mothers’ Testimony Project did not prompt the Massachusetts family court system to 
institute reforms based on its findings and recommendations.8  But why not?  Why have 
the stories of the forty women involved, bolstered by the accounts of advocates for 
battered women and their children, failed to persuade the Massachusetts court system that 
serious reform is needed to safeguard the rights, dignity, and safety of battered women 
and their children?9
One possible answer to that question lies in the way in which the data collected 
and relied upon by the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project was presented—as the 
narratives of battered women.10  Dunphy based his dismissal of the report on his belief 
6   Rhonda Stewart, Advocates Attest to Abuse Study Findings, Call for Overhaul of Family Courts, BOSTON 
GLOBE, December 5, 2002, at 1, 3.  Not all of the criticisms came from women who received adverse rulings, 
however.  Moreover, some of the human rights violations found by the project—most notably, the degrading 
treatment of battered women in the court system and the system’s permitting the batterer to continue his abuse 
using the court as a forum—are not complaints about specific rulings, but about court process.
7 Patricia Wen, Report Assails Family Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, November 26, 2002, at B-2.  Carrie Cuthbert, the 
lead author of the report, noted that such fact checking had been done in roughly one-quarter of the cases.  Id.  In 
all of those cases, the women’s accounts were verified.  Kristen Lombardi, Custodians of Abuse, BOSTON 
PHOENIX, January 9-16, 2003, ¶ 6, at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news-
_features/top/features/documents/02643515.htm.
8 Carrie Cuthbert et al., Battered Mothers v. U.S. Family Courts, 2 HUM. RIGHTS DIALOGUE 10, ¶ 11 (2003), at 
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/printerfriendlymedia.php/prmID/1047. The report apparently prompted the court 
system to engage in a self-study, however.  In August 2003, the Administrative Office of the Trial Court released 
Progress and Challenges: Viewpoints on the Trial Court’s Response to Domestic Violence.  The report employs 
a similar methodology and reaches many of the same conclusions as BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT.  The 
report will be discussed further infra.
9 Narratives have proven powerful forces for change in other contexts—for example, the legislative arena.  See 
generally Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law 
Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993). 
10 This is, of course, only one possible answer, although I believe a very plausible one.  The authors of the report 
believe that the judges were upset that the report failed to acknowledge the work that the court had done to 
improve its handling of family law cases involving domestic violence—a criticism that surprised the authors, 
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that the report did not constitute “good” social science (“the methodology is flawed”) 
because it relied on the stories of women, and because those women’s stories did not 
convince him that the courts truly had problems that needed to be addressed.  By relying 
on narrative, or “qualitative,” research, the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project gave 
state actors a convenient excuse for disregarding its findings—the report simply wasn’t 
scientific enough to be believed.
This article challenges the assumption that narrative constitutes bad science and 
argues that narratives can illuminate problems in court systems, justifying reforms.  The 
article begins by examining the methodology, findings and conclusions of the Battered 
Mothers’ Testimony Project. The article then examines the use of narrative in social 
science, human rights investigations, and the law and argues that qualitative work is 
valued in all of those settings.  Why, then, the unwillingness to credit the narratives of 
these battered mothers?  The article contends that this unwillingness to see these narrative 
accounts as indicative of larger problems within the court system is tied to a tendency to 
discount women’s voices, looking to both the social science and legal literature on this 
topic and the gender bias studies conducted by many courts in the 1980s and 90s.11
given that “the report did include a section highlighting past achievements.”  Kim Slote, Assessing the Impact of 
the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project 3 (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).  Slote also believes 
that people were surprised that they did not produce a typical policy paper or neutral review of the system and 
sought to distance themselves from it for political reasons.  Telephone interview with Kim Slote, September 29, 
2004, Naples, Florida.  Other possible reasons could include that the narratives came from poor women or 
women of color.  See text accompanying n. 156, infra.
11 The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project grew, in part, from a study commissioned by Massachusetts’ 
Supreme Judicial Court in 1989 that found that gender bias in the courts was largely being ignored.  Stewart, 
supra note 6, at 2.
As Dorothy Roberts notes, focusing on gender as the reason for oppression “forces women of color to 
fragment their experience in a way that does not reflect the reality of their lives.”  Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing 
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARVARD L. REV.
1419, 1424 (1991).  My choice to focus on the gendered dimensions of the response to the Battered Mothers’ 
Testimony Project is not meant to create such fragmentation, or to ignore the role that race likely played in the 
discounting of these narratives.  Indeed, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT documents bias the mothers 
experienced based on race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation.  BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK 
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Finally, the article asks whether the weight given to narratives about the operation 
of the court system is changed by the identity of the reporter or the type of report, 
comparing the effectiveness of first and third person narrative reports and qualitative and 
quantitative court reports.  While third person or quantitative reports may initially be 
more credible to judges and decisionmakers, using such strategies denies battered women 
the opportunity to tell their stories and judges the opportunity to develop empathy by 
hearing them.  Ultimately, silencing women’s voices in an attempt to gain widespread 
acceptance further undermines attempts to reinforce women’s credibility.  The 
discounting of women’s voices may continue to impede projects like the Battered 
Mothers’ Testimony Project from achieving meaningful change; nonetheless, collecting 
and disseminating the narratives of women affected by the system should be a crucial 
component of court reform. 
I.  The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project
Battered Mothers Speak Out, the report of the Massachusetts Battered Mothers’ 
Testimony Project, was the first family court report to expose the difficulties faced by 
battered mothers in the court system through a human rights lens.12  Using human rights 
OUT, supra note 1, at 37-39.  While the intersection of gender bias and bias based on factors other than gender is 
touched on in this article, the article does not purport to thoroughly examine those issues.
12 While Massachusetts’ study was the first, it is not the only Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project in existence.  
In June 2003, the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence released a report entitled BATTERED MOTHERS’ 
TESTIMONY PROJECT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.  Modeled on 
the Massachusetts report, the Arizona study collected the stories of 57 women to support its claim that battered 
mothers involved in custody actions in the Arizona Superior Court system were being subjected to human rights 
abuses.  Arizona’s study reports its findings in a more traditional, qualitative way, providing statistics based on 
the answers given by respondents in the study, augmented by quotes that are not linked to particular mothers and 
short anonymous case descriptions.  
Because the study does not primarily rely on narrative to bolster its arguments about the presence of 
human rights abuses, it will not be a major focus of this article. The short stories that are relayed at various points 
in the report, however, echo the stories told by the mothers in Massachusetts.  See, e.g., Arizona Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence, BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY PROJECT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO CHILD 
CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2003), at 60-61 (failure to take partner abuse seriously), 75 (denial of due 
process right to be heard), 76-77 (bias against battered women).  The study concludes that “domestic violence in 
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norms articulated in documents like the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the report catalogued the human rights violations committed against battered 
mothers by the Massachusetts family courts.13
Battered Mothers Speak Out begins by establishing the government’s 
responsibility to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens.14  In the 
context of the Massachusetts family courts, respecting, protecting and fulfilling these 
rights requires that courts not only “refrain from directly violating the human rights of 
women and children through their actions,” but also “take positive steps to protect 
children and women from abuse by non-state actors such as ex-husbands, ex-boyfriends, 
and fathers.”15  “Respect” centers on the actions that the court system takes directly 
through its “laws, agents, and systems”; respect includes the requirement that courts not 
discriminate against battered women.16  To “protect” battered women and their children, 
the Massachusetts family courts must ensure that private individuals (batterers) are not 
permitted to violate women’s and children’s human rights—for example, by using the 
court system to continue their abuse or by exposing women and children to danger 
through unsafe visitation arrangements.17  To “fulfill” their human rights, the court 
system must take active measures to ensure that battered women “have the opportunity to 
obtain satisfaction of their needs (where recognized in human rights laws and 
instruments) that cannot be secured by their own personal efforts.”18  Examples of 
fulfilling battered women’s human rights include providing battered women with “access 
Arizona is torture and…the failure of Arizona’s legal system to prevent torture places the state in non-
compliance with international laws and norms that condemn torture.”  Id. at 86, 87-96.
13 BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 9-11.






to shelter and the economic resources needed to flee their abusers and establish an 
independent, safe life.”19  The report locates the courts’ responsibility to respect, protect, 
and fulfill battered women and their children’s rights in several sources: the human 
condition20, documents binding the United States as a condition of its membership in the 
United Nations, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (“which defines violence 
against women as a human rights violation and delineates governments’ obligations to 
end and prevent it”)21, and treaties that the United States has signed but not ratified, 
including United Nations conventions on the rights of children and ending discrimination 
against women.22 Using this framework, the report investigated three broad questions:
Are the Massachusetts family courts respecting, protecting, and fulfilling 
battered mothers’ and their children’s fundamental human rights to: bodily 
integrity and freedom from violence; non-discrimination and equal protection of 
the law; freedom from torture and degrading treatment; due process; freedom of 
speech and a fair hearing; and adequate standard of living.
Are the Massachusetts family courts exercising due diligence with respect 
to violence against women and children?
Are the Massachusetts family courts acting in children’s best interests in 
child custody and visitation cases where there is a history of partner and/or child 
abuse?23
The answer to all of these questions, according to Battered Mothers Speak Out, is 
no.  The report found that the family courts committed human rights violations in the 
following areas:
I. Failure to protect battered women and children from abuse
II. Discrimination and bias against battered women
III. Degrading treatment of battered women
IV. Denial of due process to battered women
19 Id.
20 Id. at 10-11.
21 Id. at 11.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 11-12.
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V. Allowing the batterer to continue the abuse through the family 
courts
VI. Failure to respect the economic rights of battered women and 
children.24
The report examines each of these violations in turn, using the narratives of battered 
mothers to bolster its findings.25
The Massachusetts family courts fail to protect battered women and children from 
abuse in a number of ways, according to the report: by granting or recommending unsafe 
custody and visitation to batterers; by ignoring or minimizing battered mothers’ reports of 
partner and/or child abuse, failing or refusing to investigate such reports, and failing to 
examine or credit documented evidence of partner and/or child abuse; and by 
mishandling child sexual abuse allegations.26   The report tells the stories of Karen, 
Marsha, Beth, Janice, Jane, Sonia, Gabby, and others to illustrate how the courts have 
failed to protect battered women and children.27  These narratives range from quotes to 
detailed case descriptions relating the women’s experiences with the courts.  Karen’s 
story, for example, involves a lengthy description of how both the judge and the 
children’s attorney involved in her case denied her requests to curtail her former partner’s 
visitation, despite evidence that he was abusing alcohol and his new wife after having 
been released from jail for assaulting Karen (an assault witnessed by the older child).  
24 Id. at 14.
25 As previously mentioned, the report relies primarily on the narratives of the forty women interviewed for the 
project.  The report notes, however, “[T]he BMTP received (and continues to receive) far more requests from 
battered women who want to give testimony to the project than we have been able to interview and therefore 
include in this report.”  Id. at 28.
26 Id. at 15.
27 Id. at 15-24.  In each section of the report, the narrative accounts, which are the primary source material for the 
report, are supported by the observations of battered women’s advocates and followed by information derived 
from interviews with state actors (who were chosen either because two or more women involved in the study had 
complained about them, because they were identified as handling partner abuse and child custody issues well, or 
because of their specific knowledge of various aspects of the family court system).  Id. at 6-7.  Not surprisingly, 
“the statements that state actors made to us about their beliefs and their approaches to cases sharply contrasted 
with what we had learned about how these same individuals had handled the cases we investigated.”  Id. at 24.
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The visitation did not change until her partner was arrested for drunk driving, which 
prompted the children’s attorney to remark to Karen, “I guess you’re happy now.”  The 
judge continued to allow Karen’s former partner unsupervised visitation.28  Karen’s story 
highlights how the court system grants inappropriate visitation, ignores or minimizes 
mother’s concerns about their children’s well-being, and fails to credit documented 
evidence of partner abuse.29
Sonia begged the judge and guardian ad litem in her case to look at police reports 
documenting her ex-partner’s violence towards his new partner.  She remembered, 
When we went into court and when Michael was looking for sole custody, I told 
[the judge] that I felt that Luke was in a violent home and was in danger of being
harmed, and [the judge] wouldn’t have anything to do with it.  He wouldn’t listen 
to me.  I had documents there that I wanted to show him but he refused to look at 
them…[A] few weeks later, [he] gave Michael sole legal and physical custody of 
Luke.30
Their inability to make themselves heard in the court system was devastating for 
these mothers.  As Marsha explained, “I don’t think there is a worse thing in the world 
than not being able to protect your children.  Like someone’s got my hands tied behind 
my back and I’m watching them beaten up, and I can’t protect them.”31  Using the stories 
of Karen and her counterparts, the report argues that the courts are ignoring the 
international human rights laws and standards requiring them to protect battered women 
and their children from further abuse.32
28 Id. at 15-16.  Given the criticism that the report was invalid because of its reliance on the women’s subjective 
retellings of their experiences, it is noteworthy that a representative from the Battered Mothers’ Testimony 
Project was present at two of Karen’s hearings to confirm her recollections and her impressions.  Id. at 16.
29 Cassie’s example of how court actors minimized reports of partner abuse is more direct:  “In my first meeting 
with the guardian ad litem, I had told him that there was a significant history of domestic violence, [that] my ex-
partner had been to [a batterer’s intervention program] and that I was disabled as a result of the abuse, and he 
told me, “No one cares about that abuse crap.”  Id. at 19.
30 Id. at 22.
31 Id. at 16.
32 Id. at 27.  The report contends that the courts’ failures constitute violations of the rights to be free from 
violence, torture, and degrading treatment, the right to non-discrimination, and the government’s obligations to 
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Similar stories illustrate the report’s other major conclusions.  Sandy described 
the gender bias she faced when trying to explain her partner’s history of domestic 
violence against her to a guardian ad litem.33 The guardian ad litem, for example, 
despite documents from the emergency room detailing her injuries as a result of one 
assault, and a judge’s findings that Sandy’s reports of abuse were credible, told Sandy 
that depending on where her bruises were, he might deem her the offender.34 Lorie 
explained how state actors’ failure to understand the effects of abuse colored their 
assessments of the parties’ parenting abilities.  
The [guardian ad litem] was saying [that I] was psychologically unstable and, you 
know, irrational, emotional, and angry.  It’s like, yeah, if you’ve been through 10 
years of what I’ve been through….You go through hell and try to get out of hell 
and they punish you, saying, “Oh, you cry too much and you’re upset, so you 
know, the kids are more stable with the father, there’s no emotion.35
Lorie further detailed degrading treatment by judges, a custody evaluator, and a guardian 
ad litem.36
Fran was denied due process at hearings by a judge who refused to allow her to 
speak in court and by a probation officer who circumvented court orders.37  Most of the 
women described how their batterers were permitted to continue their abuse using the 
court system; Sonia’s story was typical. “He’s forced me to go back to court endlessly.  I 
exercise due diligence and to act in children’s best interests, as articulated in international treaties.  Id. at 15, 27-
28.  The courts’ failures also constitute violations of United States and Massachusetts law.  Id. at 29-30.
33 Id. at 33.    
34 Id.  Other forms of bias documented by the report include biased investigations, evaluations and reports; 
holding battered mothers to higher standards of parenting and behavior than fathers; stereotyping women as 
hysterical and unreasonable; and discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and 
sexual orientation.  Id. at 33-39.
35 Id. at 36.
36 Id. at 46.  Lorie described judges who did not let her speak at hearings, did not pay attention to the testimony 
of her witnesses, and seemed to be almost sleeping during trial.  Id.  Other denials of due process included 
pressure to engage in mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution; denial of access to guardian ad 
litem reports, and ethical issues, including conflicts of interest and misrepresentations, that operated to deny due 
process.
37 Id. at 50.  The probation officer permitted Fran’s ex-husband to attend private therapy with a counselor with no 
expertise in domestic violence in lieu of participating in batterer’s intervention counseling; general therapy is not 
an appropriate substitute for a batterer’s intervention program.   
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can’t remember how many motions we have on our docket.  There’s got to be 150.  Every 
time I turned around for years, there was another piece of paper coming in the mail from 
the courts.”38  Marsha described how the courts permitted her ex-husband to deprive her 
and her children of their economic rights, both through decisions on child support and by 
permitting her ex-husband to litigate baseless custody challenges, leaving Marsha and her 
children “scraping by.…All of her savings have gone to lawyers.”39   June recalled, “I 
remember my son having a 103-degree fever one night and having to get to the 
pediatrician, and I didn’t have a dime on me ‘cause he wasn’t paying any child 
support.”40 All of the actions described by these women, according to the report, violated 
international human rights laws and norms and Massachusetts standards, and in some 
cases, United States law.
Given the numerous human rights violations documented by the Battered 
Mothers’ Testimony Project, the report concludes with a call for Massachusetts to “take 
positive steps to remedy the human rights violations against battered mothers and their 
children….”41  Such steps include increased training for state actors on partner and child 
abuse; a reform of the guardian ad litem system; increased economic and legal resources 
for battered mothers and their children; and the creation of a system to hold the family 
courts accountable for their actions.42  While the authors believe that their findings are 
38 Id. at 59.  In addition to being permitted to file multiple harassing or retaliatory motions, batterers were 
allowed to continue their abuse via the court system by making false allegations against their victims; 
manipulating the court process to avoid or reduce their child support; and using parallel actions in courts with 
different jurisdictions to gain advantage.  Id. at 59-62. 
39 Id. at 65.  Women’s and children’s economic rights are jeopardized by the cost of family court litigation, 
family court actions (like requiring battered women to pay visitation supervisors or guardian ad litems required 
because of their partners’ abusive behavior), courts’ willingness to allow batterers to use the courts to drain their 
victims, missing work or losing jobs as a result of court dates, and their ability to find affordable, competent 
representation (needed both to secure their economic rights and to oppose baseless litigation).  Id. at 66-69.
40 Id. at 68.
41 Id. at 74.
42 Id. at 73.
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sufficient to create an understanding of the problems faced by battered mothers and their 
children in family court litigation, establish human rights abuses, and propose 
recommendations for change, they caution that they make “no claim regarding statistical 
significance, ability to generalize to a larger population, or the overall extent of the 
reported problems either in Massachusetts or elsewhere.”43
Battered Mothers Speak Out presents a compelling picture of battered women and 
their children denied justice by a court system that ignores their needs, treats them with 
disdain, and is generally insensitive to their plight.  Or, Battered Mothers Speak Out
presents nothing more than the subjective perceptions of a disgruntled handful of the 
thousands of litigants who engage with the Massachusetts family court system each year.  
In large part, the way that the study’s findings are interpreted depends on the reader’s 
willingness to accept the first person narratives of forty individual battered mothers44 as a 
sufficient basis for concluding that the Massachusetts family courts are violating battered 
mothers’ human rights.  Even the study itself is ambivalent on this point, drawing 
conclusions and making recommendations pertaining to the Massachusetts family court 
system as a whole while warning that the study “does not purport to represent all battered 
mothers who have experienced litigation in the Massachusetts family court system” and 
“makes no claim regarding…ability to generalize to a larger population.”45  Ultimately, 
the persuasiveness of Battered Mothers Speak Out is directly tied to its use of the 
narratives of battered women, a characteristic cited as a strength by the researchers  but 
dismissed by state actors.  The next section of this article examines the value placed on 
43 Id. at 8.
44   Case reviews were conducted by researchers in about one quarter of the cases, but which cases were verified 
is not clear from the report.
45 BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8. Note, however, that stories were collected from battered 
mothers in 11 of Massachusetts’ 14 counties, making it somewhat easier to make statewide claims.  Id. at 6.
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narrative research in the social science, human rights and legal communities.  Given the 
willingness of all of the relevant communities to credit narrative research, the section 
concludes that the identity of the storytellers—battered mothers—rather than the use of 
the narrative form is what caused Battered Mothers Speak Out to be largely ignored.
II. The Value of Narrative
Chief Judge Dunphy suggested in his comments at the time of publication that the 
methodology employed in Battered Mothers Speak Out was “flawed,” leading him and 
other state actors to disregard the study’s findings.  In the section entitled “Project 
Documentation and Research Strategies,” the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out
describe their methodology as combining human rights fact finding with qualitative and 
quantitative social science research methods.  They address their decision to rely 
primarily on narratives in the report, explaining, 
The goal of human rights fact-finding is to identify human rights violations as 
reported by the victims of the violations and those who witnessed them….As in 
human rights fact-finding, the driving force behind qualitative research is the 
prominence of the voices of the people under study (project participants).  
Qualitative research methodology is especially strong in enabling researchers to 
document the lived experiences of individuals and to give participants the 
opportunity to describe, in their own words, the social, cultural, and political 
phenomena affecting them.46
Was this decision to rely primarily on narrative methodologically valid given the 
current state of thinking in the fields of social science, human rights documentation and 
law?  The next sections address this question.
A. Quantitative and Qualitative Investigation in Social Science Research
1.  The False Dichotomy
46 Id. at 5.  Note that the project also used quantitative research methods to collect “sociodemographic 
information and event data about participants’ lives during a specified period of time related to the abusive 
relationship with an intimate partner and subsequent litigation in the family courts.”  Id.
14
“Valid” social science research is frequently equated with “quantitative” 
research—at the most basic level, research that relies on numbers, rather than words (the 
province of qualitative research).47  While quantitative research was the “dominant” 
approach of social scientists in the United States for many years, “since the 1960s there 
has been a revival in the fortunes of qualitative types of research in these disciplines, to 
the point where their legitimacy is widely accepted.”48  Nonetheless, social scientists 
continue to battle the perception that qualitative research is not as scientifically rigorous 
or objective as quantitative, which has implications for the use of such research in 
developing social policy.49
To flesh the differences between the two out a little more fully, quantitative 
research “implies the application of a measurement or numerical approach to the nature 
of the issue under scrutiny as well as to the gathering and analysis of data,” while 
qualitative research 
relies upon case studies or evidence gleaned from individuals or particular 
situations…[and] explores the processes behind observed associations between 
factors, charts individual outcomes and explores the meanings and contexts of 
individuals’ behaviour.  Thus, quantitative and qualitative approaches differ not 
only in the methods employed but also in the perception of the problem and the 
type of data they produce.50
47 Martyn Hammersley, Deconstructing the qualitative-quantitative divide, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE 
AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 41 (Julia Brannen, ed. 1992) (citation omitted).  Hammersley suggests that the real 
issue between the two schools of thought is precision, with quantitative researchers arguing that sufficient 
precision can be achieved only through quantification.  Hammersley cautions, however, that precision can be 
expressed in ways other than numerically, and that accuracy is more important than precision, particularly when 
numbers are used to “imply a greater degree of precision than their likely accuracy warrants.”  Id. at 42.
48 Id. at 40.
49 Roger Bullock, Michael Little & Spencer Millham, The relationships between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in social policy research, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, id. at 
89; see also Julia Brannen, Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: an overview, in MIXING 
METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH,, id. at 18; Virginia L. Olesen, Feminisms and Qualitative 
Research At and Into the Millenium, in HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna 
S. Lincoln, eds. 2000), at 217.
50 Bullock, Little & Millham, id. at 85; see also Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich, A Framework for 
Narrative Research Proposals in Psychology, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THEN TEACHING AND LEARNING OF 
NARRATIVE RESEARCH (Ruthellen Josselson, Amia Lieblich & Dan P. McAdams, eds. 2003), at 260; Herbert J. 
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Quantitative research provides social scientists with “authoritative survey 
data…assess[ing] the incidence, epidemiology and boundaries of problems of the 
situation under scrutiny.”51  Qualitative research, in contrast, provides “greater 
understanding of the meaning and context of behaviours and the processes that take place 
within observed patterns of interrelated factors” and enables researchers to examine the 
perceptions different participants have of the same situation.52
Although researchers stress that best practice frequently requires that both 
quantitative and qualitative methods be used to study a problem,53 the type of problem 
being studied generally dictates which type of research strategy should take the lead in a 
given project.  For example, in a study of parents caring for young adults with mental 
handicaps and behavior problems, the researcher explains, “The problem area itself was 
socially defined and therefore might be differently constructed by different actors, and its 
more severe manifestations were known to be likely to be distressing to those involved.  
This suggested that there would be value in a qualitative approach.”54  Because it “blurs 
easily into advocacy and efforts to find solutions to problems,”55 qualitative research is 
also well-suited to addressing “flaws and faults in society and in so doing promote 
actions that eliminate problems.”56
2.  Narrative Research as a Subset of Qualitative Research
Rubin & Irene S. Rubin, QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE ART OF HEARING DATA 32 (1995) (describing the 
“positivist” or quantitative model of research).
51 Bullock, Little & Millham, id.
52 Id. at 86.
53 See, e.g., id. at 86-87.
54  Hazel Qureshi, Integrating methods in applied research in social policy: a case study of carers, in MIXING 
METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, id. at 120.  The similarities between the factors used to 
determine that qualitative research was appropriate in this case and the challenges posed by research on battered 
mothers will be examined in Part IIID., infra.
55   Rubin & Rubin, supra note 49, at 13.
56 Id. at 35.
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Narrative research, like the type used by Battered Mothers Speak Out, is one form 
of qualitative research, an approach that often seems “heretical to those reared in a 
positivistic, scientistic atmosphere.”57  Narrative researchers contend that experiences 
have little value unconnected to the stories told by the participants, because stories are the 
means by which we understand and relate those experiences.58  Narrative research 
distinguishes itself both from the methods and the goals of quantitative research by 
stressing an examination of a subject’s life experiences and the connection of those 
experiences to historical, social and cultural contexts.59  Narrative analysis, then, has two 
goals:  to understand how people and/or groups make sense of their experiences and to 
describe the social worlds they inhabit and social resources “they draw on, resist and 
transform as they tell their stories.”60  Narratives are not simply offered in a vacuum, but 
rather used to construct theory.61
Narrative researchers reject the assertion that neutrality is either desirable or 
achievable in social science research.  While students are trained to think of research in 
terms of “objectivity” and “truth,” lacking in “personal connection and passion,” 
57 Introduction, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 4.  As June Price notes, however, “The very act of 
posing a research question will influence and shape the answer,” regardless of whether the method used to 
answer the question is quantitative or qualitative.  June Price, In Acknowledgment: A Review and Critique of 
Qualitative Research Texts, in MAKING MEANING OF NARRATIVES 2 (Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich, eds. 
1999).
58 Guy A.M. Widdershoven, The Story of Life: Hermenuetic Perspectives on the Relationship Between Narrative 
and Life History, in THE NARRATIVE STUDY OF LIVES (Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich, eds. 1993), at 7.
59Colette Daiute & Michelle Fine, Researchers as Protagonists in Teaching and Learning Qualitative Research, 
in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 62-63.  The editors of UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THE TEACHING 
AND LEARNING OF NARRATIVE RESEARCH describe the differences:  “In considering people as constructors of 
their experience, such research takes a giant step away from parsing human experience into predefined 
‘variables’ and requires of the researcher an equally major shift in perspective and approach.  Rather than 
forming hypotheses, the researcher frames questions for exploration; in place of measurement are the challenges 
of deeply listening to others; and instead of statistics are the ambiguities of thoughtful analysis of texts.”  
Introduction, id. at 3.
60 Susan E. Chase, Learning to Listen: Narrative Principles in a Qualitative Research Methods Course, in UP 
CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 80-81.
61 Blythe McVicker Clinchy, An Epistemological Approach to the Teaching of Narrative Research, in UP CLOSE 
AND PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 46.
17
narrative researchers claim that research is always affected by the researcher’s “goals, 
plans, beliefs and practices.”62  The relationships developed between subjects and 
researchers using narrative research methodology help those researchers to better 
understand their own biases, assumptions and social reactions63, allowing narrative 
researchers to be more honest about the operation of these factors on their research than 
quantitative researchers, who maintain (erroneously, according to narrative researchers) 
that their numerical methods protect them from the influence of such factors.  In fact, 
some narrative researchers maintain, “Neutrality is probably not a legitimate goal in 
qualitative research,” both because it is impossible to achieve and because it impedes the 
development of the empathetic connection between researcher and subject needed to 
elicit personal stories and probe for details.64  Despite these connections, however, 
narrative researchers argue that their results can be as generalizable as those attained in 
quantitative research—more so, if the questions being asked require more than simple 
“yes or no, approve or disapprove” responses.65
3. Battered Mothers Speak Out in the Context of Social Science Research
The main criticism leveled against Battered Mothers Speak Out involves its use of 
the narratives of battered women to support its assertion that these women’s human rights 
62 Daiute & Fine, supra note 58, at 64.  They explain that “social research is always constructed and contingent, 
that no construct or life or community preexists language or social relations; that research is about evidence, 
framing and reframing.”  Id. at 65.
63 Annie G. Rogers, Qualitative Research in Psychology: Teaching an Interpretive Process, in UP CLOSE AND 
PERSONAL, supra note 49, at 55.
64 Rubin & Rubin, supra note 49, at 13.  The authors caution, however, that balance is necessary; “too much 
sympathy can…be blinding.”  Id.
65   Id. at 72-73.  Narrative researchers have questioned whether the use of such standards is appropriate for 
evaluating their work.  Traditionally, “reliability, validity, objectivity, and replicability” were considered the 
prime criteria for evaluating research.  Narrative researchers have suggested, however, that these criteria are 
inappropriate for evaluating their work, and in fact, are contradictory to the narrative approach.  They suggest, 
instead, that the following criteria be used to evaluate their research: width, or the comprehensiveness of the 
evidence; coherence (how the parts create a complete and meaningful picture); insightfulness (innovation or 
originality in presentation and analysis); and parsimony (providing analysis based on a small number of 
concepts).  Amia Lieblich, Rivka Tuval-Mashiach & Tamar Zilber, NARRATIVE RESEARCH: READING, ANALYSIS 
AND INTERPRETATION 173 (1998). 
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were violated.  The use of such narratives is entirely appropriate in social science 
research, particularly when, as in Battered Mothers Speak Out , those narratives are 
supported by other kinds of information, including interviews and surveys of other actors 
within the system, case reviews, and external documentation of abuse.66  The procedure 
followed by the interviews conformed to social science research principles as well:  
trained interviewers used a semi-structured instrument to conduct the interviews, which 
were later transcribed and analyzed using practices accepted in the field.67
Battered Mothers Speak Out acknowledges the limitations of its research.  As  the 
authors note in a companion study, “It is important that these data be recognized as 
documentation of a set of issues based on reports of affected individuals (i.e. battered 
women referred to the project based on their dissatisfaction with family court outcomes 
or processes) rather than an attempt at definitive research into the prevalence and nature 
of the types of cases discussed.”68  In fact, the authors suggest, Battered Mothers Speak 
Out provides a starting point for future quantitative research into the scope of the 
problems it identifies, the long-term implications of custody and visitation decisions on 
66 Sixteen state actors, including seven family court judges and four guardians ad litem were interviewed.  Most 
of these state actors were contacted because of complaints against them. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra
note 1, at 7-8.  Thirty-one advocates for battered women and children completed surveys consisting of nineteen 
open-ended questions.  Id. at 6-7.  As previously noted, case reviews were conducted in about one quarter of the 
battered mothers’ cases to verify their claims.  See Wen, supra note 6, at B-2.  All of the participants had some 
form of documentation of the violence they had experienced.  Jay G. Silverman, Cynthia M. Mesh, Carrie V. 
Cuthbert, Kim Slote & Lundy Bancroft, Child Custody Determinations in Cases Involving Intimate Partner 
Violence: a Human Rights Analysis, 6 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 951, 952 (2004).
67   “Interview transcripts were read initially to identify emerging themes.  Coding schema were then developed 
to define and identify particular problems faced by participants; schema were modified to reflect new 
understanding of emerging patterns throughout the coding process.  Interrater reliability was verified through 
secondary review of all coded passages.  Coded data were managed with a customized relational Microsoft 
Access 2000 database….Frequency of defined problems among transcripts was assessed, and human rights 
violations implicated were identified.”  Silverman et. al., id.; see also BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra
note 1, at 8.  The project staff included social science researchers as well as lawyers and experts on domestic 
violence.  Slote interview, supra note 10.
68 Id. at 956.  In fact, while in the footnotes the report quantifies the number of women reporting a particular 
problem, it does not use those “statistics” to argue that any percentage of the family court population is 
experiencing similar problems.  BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8.  
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children in cases involving domestic violence, and the utility of the various solutions for 
improving the court suggested by the report.69
One particularly pointed criticism that deserves greater attention is the argument 
that the failure to incorporate competing narratives (those of the alleged perpetrators, 
lawyers, judges and/or guardians ad litem involved in the cases of the women 
interviewed) renders the women’s stories unbelievable.  While the request for this 
information seems reasonable on its face, in fact, it creates a circular argument through 
which the battered women’s narratives are silenced.  The critics seek external validation 
of the battered women’s claims from the very persons identified as having committed the 
abuse,70 or having been biased, or having discounted evidence of domestic violence 
presented to them—all of whom bring their own experiences, perspectives and biases to 
the stories they tell.  When, predictably, the actors in question deny these claims, the 
critics at best will throw up their hands and say, “The evidence is in equipoise,” and at 
worst, will use these stories to drown out those told by battered women—the very 
phenomenon the mothers describe in the report.  While some of the battered mothers’ 
claims are externally verifiable using means other than alternate narratives—for example, 
by quantifying the frequency with which custody is awarded to those alleged or found to 
have committed domestic violence or inappropriate referrals to mediation are made—
69 Id.  Using qualitative evidence to produce hypotheses that can be tested using quantitative methods, as 
suggested by the authors, is an accepted social science research practice.  Bullock, Little & Millham, supra note 
48, at 87.  The Boston Globe called for such a review after hearing only a portion of the evidence amassed by the 
researchers.  Witnesses to Abuse, supra note 4, at A-18  (“A full report on this project will be issued in October.  
But state officials should act now.  A systematic review of court cases involving domestic violence and custody 
could reveal ways to improve policies and procedures.”)
70 Note, too, that the purpose of the project was not to prove whether the women were battered or not, but to 
gauge their treatment by the courts and other state actors when they claimed that they had been battered.  As the 
authors note, “Because the main focus of this work was accountability of the government rather than of abusive 
partners, documentation and descriptions of abuse suffered by participating women and their children provide a 
context for examining actions or inactions of family court state actors as possible human rights violations….”  
Silverman et al., supra note 66, at 952.
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others are about the process itself and cannot be verified using case reviews or other 
external measures.  This is particularly true in those cases where those with whom you 
would check such claims have their own reasons for insisting that the system is fair.71  No 
record would exist, for example, of Karen72 or Lorie’s73 out-of-court conversations with 
the guardians ad litem representing their children, and the guardians ad litem are 
unlikely to verify claims that cast them in an unprofessional light.  
Moreover, asking for external validation on these types of unverifiable claims 
misses the point of the report.  The relevant inquiry here is not how many battered 
mothers received poor treatment on a number of dimensions at the hands of state actors.  
Instead, the question being asked is how and why battered mothers perceived that they 
were being mistreated by the family court system.74  Only the narratives of the battered 
mothers involved with the system can answer that question.
The battered mothers’ narratives are used to understand their individual stories as 
well as to examine the context in which those stories are being told—the family court 
system.  Qualitative research generally, and narrative research specifically, are accepted 
and acceptable methods of exploring, reporting, contextualizing and generalizing the 
experiences of discrete populations, like the women studied in Battered Mothers Speak 
Out.   The methodology used by the project allows for generalization, but the project 
71 As Anthony Amsterdam explains, “I suppose each one of us sees pretty much what his or her own head is 
screwed on to see….”  Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 9, 19 
(1994).
72 See text accompanying note 28-29, supra.
73 See text accompanying note 34, supra.
74 Ensuring that the public perceives the court system as fair should be a major concern for the court.  See Robert 
J. Aalberts, Thomas Boyt & Lorne H. Seidman, Public Defender’s Conundrum: Signaling Professionalism and 
Quality in Absence of Price, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 525, 527 (2002) (arguing that “[i]f the American people lose 
confidence in the court system, its role in protecting legal rights and creating meaningful and effective public
policy could be greatly undermined.”)
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makes no claims of quantitative statistical significance, and in fact, uses the narratives 
generated to suggest both policy changes and future research.  
B. Narrative Evidence in Human Rights Investigations
1.  Narratives and Human Rights Investigations
Human rights investigations have long been used throughout the world to 
document state abuses of power resulting in violations of international law.  The use of 
human rights investigation is a less common method of documenting domestic human 
rights violations, however.75  As Judge Dunphy opined, human rights investigations “may 
work well for systems in Third World countries, but not for a court in the United 
States.”76  But a growing number of organizations, particularly those working on behalf 
of women in the United States, are using international human rights norms to analyze the 
actions of domestic institutions.77   The Ford Foundation report Something Inside So 
Strong provides several justifications for the use of domestic human rights 
documentation:
Documenting human rights violations can be a powerful way to make the abuses 
faced by your community visible and credible, and can help to expose and challenge the 
perpetrators of the abuse.  By collecting information about human rights violations in 
your community, it is possible to introduce a human rights perspective to your work, 
while empowering community members to speak for themselves in confronting human 
75 Some have argued that the reluctance to employ these techniques is related to “a deliberate, long- standing 
effort by the federal government to deny the legitimacy of human rights and, in particular, their application to 
situations internal to the United States.”  Eunice Cho et. al., SOMETHING INSIDE SO STRONG: A RESOURCE GUIDE 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2002).
76 Lombardi, supra note 7, at ¶ 6.
77 See, e.g.,Molly Beutz et. al., THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEE AND 
IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL AREA: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2004);  Cho et.al., supra
note 75, at 40; Shruti Rana, Restricting the Rights of Poor Mothers: An International Human Rights Critique of 
Workfare, 33 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 393 (2000); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a 
Domestic Resource: Thoughts on the Case of Women’s Rights, 38 N.E. L. REV. 689, 689 (2004) (asserting that 
“International human rights treaties, human rights documents, and international and comparative legal norms are 
increasingly viewed as relevant sources of law for United States domestic lawmaking in a wide range of fields, 
including the death penalty, affirmative action and women’s rights.”) 
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rights abuses.  Documentation of abuse also provides a quantifiable, yet human face to a 
situation, providing a tool for further action.78
The authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out echoed these themes in an article 
written after the report was released.  The human rights framework allowed the authors 
“to demonstrate the linkages and overlap between the violations, the economic issues 
battered mothers face after separation, and the multiple forms of discrimination many 
battered women experience.”79  Additionally, the human rights framework helped 
battered women see their own experiences in a broader rights-based context and 
highlighted the severity of the abuses they alleged.80
Collecting the stories of those alleging human rights abuses is a cornerstone of 
this work.  “It is through individual complaints that human rights are given concrete 
meaning….When applied to a person’s real-life situation, the standards contained in 
international human rights treaties find their most direct application.”81  The narratives of 
victims are an essential, perhaps the most important, component of a human rights 
investigation.82  As the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out note, 
[H]uman rights documentation’s central source of information is first-hand 
testimonies of the survivors of such violations.  Typically, these are the very 
voices that are muted or silenced by the government and society.  In human rights 
documentation, survivor accounts are corroborated by witnesses, fact-checking, 
secondary research, and interviews with state actors.  Still, survivors’ voices 
remain paramount to the process of investigation.83
78 Cho, id. at 48; see also WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS STEP BY STEP 111 (Margaret A. Schuler & Dorothy Q. 
Thomas eds. 1997) (offering rationales for creating “national human rights systems”).
79  Cuthbert et al., supra note 8, at ¶ 7.
80 Id. at ¶ 8.
81 Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 7/Rev.1, Complaint Procedures 2 at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs7.htm.
82 Schuler & Thomas, supra note 78, at 147.
83 Kim Slote et al., Battered Mothers Speak Out: Participatory Human Rights Documentation as a Model for 
Research and Activism in the U.S. 13-14 (unpublished report on file with the author).
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Human rights organizations, from non-governmental organizations like Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, collect the stories of individuals in order to document claims of human 
rights abuses throughout the world. Investigations into human rights claims of battered 
refugee and immigrant women in Minneapolis/St. Paul,84 women raped during the war in 
the former Yugoslavia85, Afghani women86, Nigerian victims of war crimes87 and 
countless others have been supported by the testimony of the affected individuals.  The 
narratives contained in Battered Mothers Speak Out fall squarely within this tradition.
How should such narratives be compiled?  In Women’s Human Rights Step by 
Step, Margaret Schuler and Dorothy Thomas provide a blueprint for conducting a human 
rights investigation.  They separate the process into three steps: preparation, 
fieldwork/investigation, and follow-up and analysis.88  In their discussion of 
fieldwork/investigations, Schuler and Thomas explain that while “the type of evidence to 
be gathered depends on the investigation’s objectives,”89 collecting narratives is crucial.  
They state, “Whatever the investigation’s objective, the testimony of the victims of the 
abuse is very important.”90  Such testimony should be detailed and can be supplemented 
by the testimony of others with first-hand knowledge of the abuse being studied as well 
as secondary information from other sources.91  Evidence should be collected from all 
sides to “assure[] balance and impartiality and provide[] a more thorough representation 
84 See generally Beutz et al., supra note 77.
85 International Human Rights Law Group, No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based 
Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 89 (1994).
86 Sonali Kolhatkar, The Impact of U.S. Intervention on Afghan Women’s Rights, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 12 
(2002).
87 Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes: Towards a More Pragmatic 
Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89 (2003).
88 See Schuler & Thomas, supra note 78, at 140-54.




of what occurred.”92  Because “[t]he value of the evidence depends on its accuracy, 
reliability, and specificity,” investigators should also seek to corroborate what they have 
learned through direct testimony; methods of corroboration include interviewing other 
witnesses or collecting similar complaints from other sources.93
2. Battered Mothers Speak Out as Human Rights Investigation
While critics of Battered Mothers Speak Out doubted whether the use of human 
rights investigation was an appropriate framework for addressing a domestic issue, no 
one questioned whether the authors of the study followed an established process for 
collecting narratives in such an investigation.  The human rights community generally 
seems to agree that collecting the stories of victims is an acceptable, even essential, 
component of building a human rights documentation case; the value of those narratives 
as justification for policy change does not seem to spark the same academic debates as in 
the social science and legal worlds.  The process for collecting such narratives seems 
fairly uncontroversial as well; in fact, little has been written about how human rights 
documentation should be conducted (as opposed to why).94
The authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out adhered to the general principles set 
forth by Schuler and Thomas in Women’s Human Rights Step by Step.  They collected 
the stories of victims and made those stories the focal point of their investigation.95  They 
supplemented the stories with accounts of other first hand witnesses—advocates for 
battered women and their children.96  Researchers also interviewed state actors, many of 
92 Id. at 147.
93 Id.
94 International human rights lawyers I contacted saw the collection of victim stories as such a given in human 
rights investigations that they had not sought and could not come up with protocols for engaging in such work.  
E-mail from Sarah Paoletti, Washington, D.C., August 4, 2004 (on file with the author).  
95 BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 5.
96 Slote et al., supra note 83, at 16.
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whom disagreed with the victims about the way in which the Massachusetts family courts 
operated; 97 including these perspectives allowed researchers to provide a more balanced 
account.  Researchers sought to corroborate the victims’ stories through the use of 
secondary documentation.98
The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project has been recognized as a model for 
conducting domestic human rights investigations.  In its publication Something Inside So 
Strong: A Resource Guide on Human Rights in the United States, the Ford Foundation 
calls the Project a “case in point” for conducting human rights documentation in the 
United States.99
C. Narratives and the Law
1. The Role of Narratives in Legal Scholarship
While lawyers are, fundamentally, storytellers100, until recently legal scholarship 
did not embrace the use of narratives.101  But as scholars examining issues of race102, 
gender103, poverty104, and sexual orientation105 have increasingly come to rely on their 
97 BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 7.
98 Lombardi, supra note 7, at ¶ 6.
99 Cho et al., supra note 75, at 49.  Criticism from the human rights community centered not on the project’s 
process, but on its aggressive stance.  Mindy Roseman questioned whether the project would have done more 
good if it had “constructively engage[d]” the courts “rather than confront[ing] them.”  Mindy Roseman, Beyond 
Name and Blame, 2 HUM. RIGHTS DIALOGUE 10, ¶ 5 (Fall 2003), at 
http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/1110.
100 See John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What Is a True Believer To Do When 
His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L REV. 85, 87-88 (1999).
101   As Binny Miller notes, Karl Llewellyn was emphasizing the importance of stories in his work in 1941.  
Miller distinguishes stories from narratives, however, explaining, “A story describes an account of a happening, 
while a narrative denotes a broader theme or meaning.  Stories are the raw material of personal experience; 
narratives are a construction from those stories.”  Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The 
Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2000).
102 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993); Patricia J. 
Williams, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
103 See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 1 (1991).
104 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 
100 YALE L. J. 2107 (1991).
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own stories, as well as the stories of clients and others, in their scholarship, a 
conversation about the worth of narrative legal scholarship has emerged.  
Narratives in legal scholarship describe the experience of individuals and groups 
with the legal system and provide context for these experiences.106  Using narratives in 
legal scholarship is appealing, in part, because it mirrors what lawyers do.107  Proponents 
of narrative legal scholarship also stress how narratives bring the voices of those 
traditionally deprived of power within the legal system to the forefront.108  Arguing that
while it may appear neutral, the law itself is a story, structured around narratives 
developed by the powerful, proponents of narrative theory offer alternative narratives to 
illustrate the ways that the law excludes these voices and advocate for the need to reform 
the law to address “outsider” voices.109  Narratives help to create common ground, 
allowing individuals to understand and empathize with the experiences of individuals and 
groups who are, or seem, different.110  Narratives can bridge the gap between the 
abstractions of the law and the individual experiences of the humans involved in legal 
105 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1994); Timothy E. Lin, Social 
Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 Colum. 
L. Rev. 739 (1999).
106  Mitchell, supra note 100, at 89.
107  “In other corners of the legal world, we find tasks that immerse lawyers in the concrete, require us to be 
sensitive to the particularities of voice, demand that we find meaning in the nonlinear or ambiguous—require that 
we exercise, in short, many of the same skills necessary to comprehend legal narratives.” Kathryn Abrams, 
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1043 (1991)
108 See generally Abrams, id. (examining the use of narratives in feminist legal scholarship); Dana Raigrodski, 
Breaking Out of “Custody”: A Feminist Voice in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1301, 1311 (1999).
109 Abrams, id. at 984; Mitchell, supra note 100, at 96-97.  Dana Raigrodski, looking at this issue from the 
feminist perspective, notes, “To the extent that personal experiences may differ according to gender, these 
different ‘women’s’ experiences are often not accounted for within prevailing legal doctrines and discourses.”  
Raigrodski, id. at 1306. 
110 Mitchell, id. at 95-96; Jane C. Murphy, supra note 9, at 1253.  But see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, 
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 849 (1993) (hereinafter 
Telling Stories Out of School) (arguing that people are unlikely to learn from stories that do not resonate with 
their own experiences).
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proceedings.111  As in social science, narratives permit feminist scholars to challenge “the 
jurisprudential insistence on a fictional abstract discourse of objectivity and 
reasonableness” resulting from the imposition of these “masculine” values as the norm.112
Even critics of the use of narrative agree that narratives featuring these “stories from the 
bottom” have an important role to play in legal scholarship.113
2.  Evaluating Legal Narratives
Critics of narrative scholarship have noted a number of concerns about this type 
of work:  that the stories told by narrative scholars lack normative legal content; are not 
persuasive; are not trustworthy; are not typical; and curtail further discussion.114  Even if 
the narratives are sufficiently “valid,” an additional concern arises about the quality of the 
scholarship itself.115  Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn.116
Some critics contend that narratives lack normative legal content.  This argument 
is generally framed in one of two ways: either the narrative fails to “shed…even 
descriptive light on a particular legal problem” or implicate a legal rule or the narrative 
111 Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2099, 2105 (1989); Elizabeth J. Samuels, Stories Out of School: Teaching the Case of Brown v. Voss, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1445, 1446-48 (1995).
112 Raigrodski, supra note 108, at 1324.  Raigrodski argues further that employing narratives in judicial 
decisionmaking could create more just results, affirm the justice of the law for the public, and decrease 
stereotypical thinking about women.  Id. at 1326-27.
113 Farber & Sherry, supra note 110, at 827-30.
114 Abrams, supra note 107, at 978-980.  
115  Farber & Sherry, supra note 110, at 831.
116   The bulk of the critique of narrative legal scholarship discussed in this section comes from the Farber and 
Sherry piece Telling Stories Out of School.  Defenders of narrative scholarship have questioned the legitimacy of 
the standards articulated by Farber and Sherry and made powerful arguments that narrative scholars need not 
have their scholarship judged by those standards.  See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 255 (1994); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 665 (1993); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of 
Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803 (1994); see also 
Arthur Austin, Evaluating Storytelling as a Type of Nontraditional Scholarship, 74 NEB. L. REV. 479 (1995) 
(offering an alternative set of criteria for assessing the worth of narrative scholarship).  While I agree with many 
of the arguments made in response to Farber and Sherry’s article, I have chosen to use their standards as the 
benchmark for measuring narrative scholarship precisely because they are the harshest critics; showing that 
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT addresses their concerns bolsters the argument that gender bias, not bad 
scholarship, is the reason for the report’s rejection.  
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does not “contribute to the formulation of a legal response” to the legal issue or problem 
identified in the narrative.117  This concern about normative legal content is tied to the 
question of whether the narrative is (or can be) sufficiently persuasive to justify 
challenging or changing existing norms.118  The persuasiveness of a narrative is, in turn, 
affected by whether the narrative is perceived as true, as typical, and can create 
understanding in a listener who has not shared the experience.
For Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, discovering and communicating “truths” 
about the legal system is the function of legal scholarship.119  While narratives are an 
integral part of the legal system, critics note that the “truth” derived from competing 
narratives is generally established through the adversarial process.120  Without a judicial 
declaration of “truth,” critics argue, the credibility of the narrative must be accepted on 
faith, a difficult task for readers whose experiences do not resonate with those described 
by the author.121  A skeptical reader’s credulity may be further tested by the emotional 
content of some narratives; the discomfort of sharing personal revelations may lead 
readers to “discount, discredit, or otherwise distance themselves from such 
discussions.”122  Moreover, relying on readers to determine whether a story is truthful or 
117   Abrams, supra note 107, at 978.
118 Id.
119 Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dmitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on 
Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 648.
120 Austin, supra note 116, at 525 (“[A]bsent a confession or trial, it is impossible to determine truthfulness.”)
121 Abrams, supra note 107, at 978-79.  As Farber and Sherry note, however, “One of the staples of feminist 
literature is that women’s assertions are treated as presumptively unreliable and lacking in credibility.”  Farber & 
Sherry, supra note 110, at 834.  Farber and Sherry discount this notion, arguing, “It would be disastrous to 
reinforce the idea that women…do not adhere to the same standards of ‘truthfulness’ as white men.” Id.  Farber 
and Sherry misstate the feminist position, however.  The argument is not that women do not adhere to the same 
standards of truthfulness, but that despite adhering to those standards, women are nonetheless viewed as not 
being as truthful or credible.  This contention will be examined in part IV, infra.
122 Abrams, id. at 979.
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not is problematic, argue the critics, given that social science research indicates that 
humans are poor judges of truthfulness.123
Even if a narrative is truthful, the critics contend, it should not serve as the basis 
for policy change unless it is also typical.  One person’s experience should not serve as 
the basis for change that affects many, many others, the argument goes, unless the 
experience related in the narrative is common to a significant number of others.124
Determining typicality can be as challenging as ascertaining truth; “people are too quick 
to assume the presence of a pattern from a small number of cases.”125
Finally, narrative scholarship must be good scholarship.  Simply telling an 
evocative story is insufficient to constitute quality legal scholarship   As with social 
science research, that story must be tied to some kind of analysis to assure the reader both 
that the story is “credible and representative” and to place the story in the context of the 
wider legal debate with which the story is concerned.126  As Farber and Sherry explain, 
“A legal story without analysis is much like a judicial opinion with ‘Findings of Fact’ but 
no ‘Conclusions of Law.’”127
3.  Battered Mothers Speak Out as Legal Narrative
Determining whether Battered Mothers Speak Out constitutes sound legal 
scholarship according to the standards set forth by critics of narrative legal scholarship 
123 Farber & Sherry, supra note 110, at 837.  Nonetheless, they state, “We do not mean to assert that legal 
scholars should consider only evidence meeting formal social science standards.”  Id. at 838.   Abrams counters 
that argument by noting that in various other disciplines—like, as discussed earlier, social science—the notion 
that an objective truth exists is being challenged.  In the law, as in social science, “the problems scholars choose 
to study and the methods by which they investigate and assess claims…are shaped by language, personal or 
cultural experience, historical context, or intellectual tradition.”  Abrams, supra note 107, at 1014.  While 
objectivity may remain the “dominant paradigm,” it is no longer the only means by which claims can be 
supported.  Id. at 1015.
124 Abrams, id. at 980; Farber & Sherry, id. at 839.
125 Farber & Sherry, id. at 839.
126 Id.at 852-54.
127 Id. at 854.
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depends on the answers to the questions posed above.  Do the narratives have normative 
legal content?  Are they persuasive?  Trustworthy?  Typical?  Analytical?  Each of these 
questions is considered below.
Normative legal content refers both to the narrative’s ability to highlight a legal 
problem and to suggest a legal solution to that problem.  Certainly Battered Mothers 
Speak Out meets both of those objectives.  The report highlights the range of negative 
experiences battered mothers had with the family courts of Massachusetts128 and suggests 
ways that family court personnel, judges, probation officers, guardians ad litem and 
others with roles in the functioning of the family court could address these problems.129
While the changes recommended relate to process, rather than doctrine, they nonetheless 
require a legal system response and therefore have normative legal content.130
Are the narratives contained in Battered Mothers Speak Out persuasive and 
trustworthy?  These are harder questions to answer, partly because few have weighed in 
on these questions, and partly because answering the questions requires deciding whose 
observations to accept.  The narratives seemed to resonate with the Boston Globe,131 as 
well as with battered women’s advocates throughout the country; the project has been or 
is being replicated in a number of other states.132  Battered mothers identified with the 
stories, calling lead author Carrie Cuthbert to tell her, “This is my story.  Your project 
128 See BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 15-71.
129 Recommendations were made for the courts, legislature, non-governmental organizations and the legal 
profession and included reforming the guardian ad litem system, training for family court personnel, practice 
standards for judges and probate probation officers, and administrative changes to enhance accountability of 
family court system actors.  Id. at 74-83.  
130 Doctrinal changes are largely unnecessary because adequate statutory and case law exists to protect battered 
mothers in Massachusetts, if that law is followed.  The family court system’s failure to comply with existing state 
law is a mainstay of the report.  Id. at 14.
131 See text accompanying n. 4, supra.
132 Silverman et. al., supra note 66, at 955.
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made me feel like I’m not alone.”133  Fathers’ rights, groups, however, disagreed, 
describing the report as “one-sided.”134  The court, too, tacitly challenged the veracity of 
the reports by suggesting the need for external validation of the claims.135  Very little 
other documentation sharing perceptions of the narratives exists.136  It is likely that most 
of the readers of the report were people with a stake in the debate, and their views are 
represented in the comments above.  
Kathryn Abrams argues that individuals can determine the validity of narratives 
based on a number of factors.  
[I]f I read the particularized accounts of each, and if I find that they have an 
acceptable degree of internal consistency, create a plausible account of a particular set of 
events, and do not seem suspicious in tone, I begin to have a belief that is not based on 
my own experience….I believe [narratives], in other words, in the same way and for 
many of the same reasons that I would believe an effective witness in a courtroom.137
But, Farber and Sherry contend, those standards (although largely the same as 
those relied upon by the Supreme Court) are not themselves trustworthy enough to 
employ.138
Ultimately, the problem with using the standards of persuasiveness and 
trustworthiness to evaluate narrative legal scholarship is that they are largely 
unattainable.  The different life experiences, preferences and biases that color narratives 
also color responses to narratives.  As a result, few narratives will create the kind of 
consensus around persuasiveness and trustworthiness that critics of narrative scholarship 
133 Wellesley Centers for Women, Battered Mothers Fight to Survive the Family Court System, RESEARCH AND 
ACTION REPORT, Fall/Winter 2003, at 8, at www.wcwonline.org.
134 Wen, supra note 7, at B-2.
135 Id.
136 In a heated listserv debate on the American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law’s Child-DV 
listserv, battered women’s advocates, custody evaluators and others debated the merits of the report.  While some 
of the debate had to do with these questions, the debate largely centered on the validity of the report as social 
science research.  E-mails on file with the author. 
137 Abrams, supra note 107, at 1002.
138 Farber & Sherry, supra note 110, at 836-37.
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would require, especially when those narratives involve subjects as emotional and hotly 
contested as domestic violence and child custody.  It seems unreasonable, then, to judge 
the validity of the narratives found in Battered Mothers Speak Out by these standards.
Are these narratives typical?  Farber and Sherry stress that “typicality is unrelated 
to any commitment to ‘objectivity’ as a philosophical position.  Instead, we are merely 
asking, ‘If we checked with more people in the same situation, how many of them would 
tell similar stories?’”139  The difficulty with this standard is defining the phrase “people in 
the same situation.”  The responses from other battered mothers and advocates for 
battered women strongly suggest that these narratives are typical, so long as “other 
people in the same situation” is defined as “other battered mothers in the family court 
system.”  If the definition is “other mothers in the family court system” or “other 
individuals in the family court system,” the answers would obviously be very different.  
Again, the subjectivity of the inquiry makes determining whether the standard has been 
attained almost impossible.
Battered Mothers Speak Out does contain the kind of analysis Farber and Sherry 
deem necessary for narrative scholarship to be “good” scholarship.  The report ties the 
issues raised by the battered mothers in their narratives to provisions in international, 
federal, and state law and argues that state actors have violated these international norms 
and United States and Massachusetts laws in the cases of these forty women.  Whether 
the reader agrees with the argument is not dispositive under Farber and Sherry’s schema; 
the report provides the type of rigorous legal analysis—the conclusions of law to 
accompany the findings of fact—required for quality narrative legal scholarship. 
139 Id. at 839.
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Battered Mothers Speak Out falls squarely within the tradition of using narratives 
to make change in social science research, human rights investigation, and the law.  The 
stories very clearly illustrate how the legal and human rights of the forty women 
interviewed were violated by the actions and inactions of various state actors.140  The fact 
that narratives were used to illuminate the problems in the Massachusetts family courts 
should not have precluded state actors from crediting its allegations.  
The problem with these narratives is not that they are the stories of individuals.  
Instead, their credibility is compromised by who is telling the stories—battered women.  
Women’s voices have historically been discounted by the legal system, and battered 
women are particularly suspect.  The next section looks at the legacy of silenced women 
and gender bias in the courts to argue that the storytellers, not the stories themselves, 
were what kept Battered Mothers Speak Out from achieving the kind of policy change it 
should have prompted.
III. Narrative and Gender
The effectiveness of Battered Mothers Speak Out as an impetus for court change 
depends largely on whether the narratives of the forty battered mothers it contains are 
believed.  The willingness to believe these stories is tied to assumptions about the 
credibility of women’s testimony.  This section asks whether the women’s stories—
particularly battered women’s stories—are generally deemed credible by judges and other 
state actors, or, alternatively, whether women face an uphill battle in having their stories 
believed.  Social science research and legal scholarship on the credibility of women, 
140 Interestingly, a great deal of debate has centered on the validity of the claims that the report never makes, i.e., 
that a certain percentage of batterers is awarded custody inappropriately.  These claims were part of the argument 
discussed at note 136 supra.
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reinforced by reports studying gender bias in the courts in the 1980s and 90s, suggests 
that the latter is true.
A.  Devaluing Women’s Stories
For women’s stories to be believed, they must first be heard.  Elizabeth Schneider, 
building on the work of Carol Gilligan, has suggested that being heard is a two-step 
process.  Schneider explains, “The first stage is to recognize women’s different voice, or 
voices, and to make it possible for these voices to be heard.  The second stage is to 
recognize all the ways women’s voices can be heard and yet not really heard—to identify 
what I call the complexities of voice.”141  While Schneider believes that women’s voices 
are beginning to be incorporated into American law, those voices nonetheless “may not 
really be heard” for a number of reasons.142 Listeners may find it difficult to sort through 
the plurality of women’s voices, as there is no singular “women’s voice.”143  Moreover, 
the stories that battered women tell are stories of violence, from which men “disconnect” 
and women “dissociate”; “both responses might be understood as forms of denial.”144
Gender bias further muffles the voices of women in the legal system.  Bias against 
women continues to pervade American society145; the legal system is no exception.
141 Elizabeth M. Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 102-03 (2000); see also Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, Hearing Women Not Being Heard: On Carol Gilligan’s Getting Civilized and the Complexities of 
Voice, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1994).
142 Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING, id. at 103.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Philip N. Cohen & Matt L. Huffman, Individuals, jobs and labor markets: The Devaluation of 
Women’s Work, 68 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 443 (2003) (examining gender bias in employment); Diane E. 
Hoffman & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain:A Bias Against Women in the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 13, 21 (2001) (arguing that women’s reports of pain are taken less seriously by doctors than 
men’s); Bernice Lott, The Devaluation of Women’s Competence, 41 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 43, 47-50 (1985) (outlining 
research on women’s competence as measured through external evaluation); Theodore W. McDonald, Loren L. 
Toussaint, & Jennifer A. Schweiger, The Influence of Social Status on Token Women Leaders’ Expectations 
About Leading Male-Dominated Groups, 50 SEX ROLES 401, 402-03 (2004) (describing studies on women’s 
lower social status); see also Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, The Family, and the Lawyering Process: 
Lessons From Studies on Gender Bias and the Courts, 27 FAM. L. Q. 247, 263 n. 52 (citing studies); Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: Time Is Not the Cure, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 413, 416-17 (citing studies).  
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“That women have voluntarily engaged law at all is a triumph of determination 
over experience.  It has not been an act of faith.”146  Bias against women has long been an 
issue for courts, in part because women operate in a legal system developed by men, for 
men.147  While women involved with the courts are devalued148 in any number of ways, 
one crucial manifestation of this bias is the tendency of legal system actors to doubt 
women’s credibility.149  Studies of jurors reveal the belief that women are “less rational, 
less trustworthy, and more likely to exaggerate than men.”150  These doubts about 
credibility stem from the prevailing consensus of how a credible witness sounds: “like a 
man.”151  Judges may even require more evidence from women than men to prove the 
146 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L. J. 1281, 1284 (1991).
147 As Catherine MacKinnon notes, “No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the 
social order under which women, as well as men, live.  Nor was the condition of women taken into account or 
the interest of women as a sex represented.”  MacKinnon, id. at 1281; see also Christy Gleason, Presence, 
Perspectives and Power: Gender and the Rationale Differences in the Debate Over the Violence Against Women 
Act, 23 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 1, 9 (2001) (describing the judiciary as “an institution steeped in male tradition 
and dominated by male perspectives on the bench and in chambers….”); Regina Graycar, The Gender of 
Judgments: Some Reflections on “Bias,” 32 UNIV. OF BRITISH COLUMBIA L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (arguing that “If 
there is only an issue of ‘gender’ when something is done by or pertains to women (and not when it is 
overwhelmingly done by men) and ‘bias’ connotes deviation from a norm that is never articulated, but is in fact a 
white, male norm, then a case can be made for the proposition that judging is, or is perceived as, a white male 
activity.”); Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 141, at 104-05.
148 Martha Chamallas describes devaluing as “bias that may or may not be legally prohibited.”  Martha 
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74  S. CAL. L. 
REV. 747, 756 (2001).  Devaluing “operates to fix a ‘gender’ or ‘race’ to a neutral activity or category and 
simultaneously to place it on a hierarchy of value”—for example, women’s credibility or women’s testimony.  
Id. at 772.  One notable feature of devaluation is that it is “masked,” making it difficult to determine whether it is 
operating within the system.  Id. at 775.
149 Lynn Hecht Schafran suggests that there are three forms of credibility: collective credibility, or credibility 
resulting from membership in a group; contextual credibility, or credibility which depends on an understanding 
of the context of the claim; and consequential credibility, being taken seriously and having harms done to you 
taken seriously.    Schafran argues that women lack all three forms of credibility in the legal system.  Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, in SUBTLE SEXISM: CURRENT PRACTICE AND 
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 216-225 (Nijole Benokraitis ed. 199?); see also Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to 
Women’s Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 CRIM. L. FORUM 327, 332 (1993).
150 Linell A. Letendre, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence 
Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 973, 981 (2000).
151   Women are more likely to exhibit speech features associated with powerlessness (high pitch, frequent 
smiling, less numerical specificity) and speak hesitantly, even if certain, while men are more likely to use more 
numerical specificity less accurately and to speak confidently even if unsure or wrong.  Judges may be more 
likely to ascribe blame to a person using a powerless speech style.  Mack, supra note 149, at 330-31.
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same claims.152  Questions about women’s truthfulness have been long been raised in the 
context of rape and sexual assault153; such doubts now surface in cases where women 
allege other forms of injury, like sexual harassment or sex-based discrimination.154  The 
wishes expressed by women in right-to-die cases are routinely discounted, while those of 
men are respected.155  The stories of women of color have been subject to especially 
harsh scrutiny.156 So have the stories of battered women.
Battered mothers confront the same skepticism about their credibility as other 
women, but their testimony is further shadowed by myths and stereotypes about victims 
of domestic violence.157  Because stories about domestic violence “often appear to judges 
152 Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5 (1990) 
(citing Maryland’s gender bias study).
153 See, e.g., Martha F. Davis et al., Brief of Petitioner: Brzonkala v. Morrison; U.S. v. Morrison, 9 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 315, 334-35 (2000) (describing how judges and other state actors subject rape victims to 
excessive scrutiny, casting doubt on their credibility) (citations omitted); Jan Jordan, Beyond Belief? Police, rape 
and women’s credibility, 4 CRIM. JUSTICE 29, 30-31 (discussing how women’s credibility is doubted by police 
and judges in rape cases); see generally Mack, supra note 149, at 332-36.  These questions persist even in the 
absence of studies confirming that women lie about rape more frequently that other victims lie about other 
crimes.  See State v. Guenther, 2004 N.J. LEXIS 941, 55 (N.J. Sup. Ct. August 9, 2004); Susan Estrich, Palm 
Beach Stories, 11 LAW & PHIL. 5, 13 (1992).
154 The Honorable Diane Wood explained why who makes credibility determinations is important, stating, “[A]ll 
cases begin with a story: a story told by the potential plaintiff about something that happened to her that she 
believes violated her legal rights.  Who hears these stories?  Who believes them?  What difference does it make if 
someone thinks they are plausible or not?  On what will the listener draw in making that crucial initial 
determination?….Who created that law, which I remind you must be followed under the principles of stare 
decesis?  In a word, men.  Now you well might ask—indeed, you have an obligation to ask—why that should 
make any difference….[T]here is still an experiential gap between the finest man and the average woman when it 
comes to sex discrimination. [This gap] has an impact on a trial judge’s assessment of a record….”  Judge Wood 
concludes that “these stories are still falling on deaf, or partially deaf, ears.”  Diane P. Wood, Sex Discrimination 
in Life and Law, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 1, 4-6 (1999).
155 National Conference of State Trial Judges, THE JUDGE’S BOOK 110 (citing study on decisionmaking in right-
to-die cases where no living will exists).  The Judge’s Book concludes about the findings of that study, “In other 
words, men are rational, independent beings whose moral agency must be respected even when they become 
incompetent, but women are only children.”  Id.
156 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import of 
the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings: Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1467, 
1470 (describing how perceptions of black women’s chastity affect their credibility); National Conference of 
State Trial Judges, supra note 155, at 113 (discussing bias against black victims of domestic violence); Maria L. 
Ontiveros, Rosa Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher Darden, and Me: Issues of Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in 
Evaluating Witness Credibility, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 135 (examining how the failure to understand class, 
race, and gender issues affected determinations of a witness’s credibility).
157 Studies show that “jurors construct stories based on the evidence presented and the jurors’ own life 
experiences….jurors may ‘fill in the blanks’ of the story, consciously or unconsciously, based on their own life 
experiences….Thus, if jurors accept the commonly held myths about domestic violence and the defense further 
reinforces these misconceptions at trial, they may ‘fill in the blanks’ with an unrealistic view of the violent 
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as problems relating to personality flaws, relationships gone bad, anger and jealousy,” 
and therefore as deviations by both parties from the standards of acceptable behavior 
between intimate partners, judges can more easily discount the credibility of the women 
telling the stories.158  Battered women frequently respond to violence in ways that are 
suspect to those who place their faith in the legal system: refusing to turn to police and 
courts159, delaying the telling of their stories, minimizing or underestimating harms, and 
revising stories as they recover from the abuse.160  Moreover, judges who lack experience 
with domestic violence may rely on courthouse assumptions about the dubious legitimacy
of such claims and the pretextual reasons women have for filing them.161  Judges question 
the ulterior motives of women bringing domestic violence claims—“they are often 
considered manipulators and liars intent on using the court to achieve some wrongful 
purpose, such as revenge or advantage in a divorce case”—further calling their credibility 
into doubt.162
relationship, and their evaluation of the evidence may be based on misconceptions and prejudices unsupported by 
scientific research.”  Carolyn Copps Hartley, “He Said, She Said”: The Defense Attack of Credibility in 
Domestic Violence Felony Trials, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 510, 539 (2001).  Judges are likely subject to 
the same thought processes.  In fact, THE JUDGES’ BOOK warns, “Judges should be careful not to project their 
own powerful positions in life onto battered women and assess or direct these women’s actions in the context of 
their own vastly different life situations.”  National Conference of State Trial Judges, supra note 153, at 111.
158 Advocating for Victims of Domestic Violence, 20 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 73, 76-77 (1999).  This particular 
judge had difficulty discerning which claims were true because the “word around the underground” was that 
domestic violence claims were being fabricated to evict men from their homes.  The judge noted a recent case in 
which a judge denied a restraining order, finding “on the basis of the record, it seemed like the allegations were 
fabricated,” only to have the abuser kill his victim and himself shortly thereafter.  Id. at 77.  
159   For reasons why battered women might avoid the legal system, see generally Leigh Goodmark, Law is the 
Answer? Do We Know That For Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 
ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2004).
160 Schneider, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING, supra note 141, at 106-07.  One study of simulated 
sexual harassment trials suggests that women are deemed most credible when they are emotional and their 
harassers are not; when both the victim and perpetrator are emotional, the credibility of the victim declined.  
Margaret Gibbs et al., Factors Affecting Credibility in a Simulated Sexual Harassment Hearing, 1 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 366, 376 (1995).
161 Deborah M. Weissman, Gender Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between “The Truly National and the 
Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1122 (2001); see also Graycar, supra note 147, at 15 (arguing that courts 
use the concept of judicial notice to “incorporate into their judgments commonsense ideas about the world, 
common assumptions or, indeed, widely held misconceptions” and asking “whose knowledge ‘common 
knowledge’ is and whose version of reality has authority.”)
162 Id.
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Battered Mothers Speak Out documents how state actors question the truthfulness 
of battered mothers’ allegations of abuse in the context of custody decisionmaking.163
The report’s finding that actors in the Massachusetts family courts believe that women 
fabricate claims of abuse is consistent with other discussions on the perceived credibility 
of battered women.  In fact, judges are often skeptical—and encouraged to be skeptical--
of battered women’s claims164, particularly when custody is at issue.  As Martha Fineman 
notes in her discussion of the National Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Child Custody’s 
Legal and Mental Health Perspectives on Child Custody Law: A Deskbook for Judges,
[T]he Deskbook for judges appears to anticipate that disbelief is to be not only 
expected but also encouraged as the initial judicial response.  The Deskbook’s 
chapter on domestic violence devotes an entire section (one out of only five in 
total) to credibility.  Titled “Problems of Proof; Determining Credibility,” the 
section begins with the statement of “common knowledge that, for a variety of 
reasons, psychological as well as familial, determining the truth when allegations 
of domestic violence emerge is a difficult business.”165
The Deskbook admonishes judges not to allow abusive spouses to offer excuses 
for their conduct, but also instructs them to take a “similarly firm stance” against parents 
who complain of “common (if hardly exemplary) behavior” or who make false claims of 
abuse.166  Fineman asks, “What are judges to make of this series of statements, 
163 BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 41.  Joan Meier argues that this skepticism makes any claim 
of judicial neutrality inherently suspect; “those who are predisposed to believe that women often fabricate or 
exaggerate domestic violence allegations are likely to be harder to persuade of the truth of such allegations, than 
those who are predisposed to believe that men frequently beat women.”  Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child 
Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. J. J. 
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 682 (2003)
164 Social science research has found that men and women perceive domestic violence differently; “[w]hat some 
men may see as normal and ordinary behavior, many women consider potentially violent.”  Renee L. 
Jarusinsky, Gender Difference in Perceiving Violence and Its Implication for the VAWA’s Civil Rights Remedy, 
27 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 965, 984 -85 (2000) (citing Russell P. Dobash et al., Separate and Intersecting Realities: 
A Comparison of Men's and Women's Accounts of Violence Against Women, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 382 
(1998)).  This “gender gap” in perception necessarily colors the way in which a legal system constructed on the 
male experience looks at claims of domestic violence.
165 Martha Albertson Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 FAM. L. Q. 211, 219 (2002).  The 
166 Id.
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particularly since actual violence is equated with exaggeration and misrepresentation of 
violence for purposes of provoking judicial wrath?”167  Fineman concludes, 
The Deskbook suggests that judges look for collaboration from other credible 
witnesses or police reports or else reasons why a woman did not complain earlier.  
The inference is that many women are likely to lie or exaggerate about the men 
with whom they find themselves entangled within the legal system….The 
commentary and approach of the Deskbook is couched in the belief that men need 
protection from the lies of women, who are vindictive and unscrupulous and who 
will say and do anything at the expense of their children.168
Encouraging judges and other state actors to be skeptical of claims of domestic 
violence creates a Catch-22 for a battered mother: if she doesn’t raise the issue, the court 
has no context for considering her actions and her reluctance to permit unsupervised 
visitation or share custody with her former partner.  If she discloses the abuse, the 
attitudes of judges and others make it “highly unusual for a battered mother in private 
litigation to be recognized by a court to be sincerely advocating for her children’s safety.  
Rather, her very status as a litigant, a mother, and battered, seems to ensure that she will 
be viewed as, at best, merely self-interested, and at worst, not credible.”169  Given the 
skepticism with which judges approach individual litigants’ claims of domestic violence, 
167 Id.  Fineman further notes that the Deskbook treats acts of violence as less serious when they “arise in the 
context of divorce in marriages without a long-standing history of prior incidents,” which ignores the frequency 
with which separation triggers domestic violence.  Id. at 220.
168 Id. at 222-23.  These inferences are made despite the understanding of professionals working with domestic 
violence victims that women are actually reluctant to disclose abuse to legal system professionals, particularly in 
custody cases, because of fear of both the abuser and the system’s perception of women who make such claims. 
Id. at 218, see also Meier, supra note 163, at 684.  This skepticism about battered women’s claims, Meier notes, 
is exacerbated because “common assumptions about witness credibility backfire when applied to victims and 
perpetrators of domestic violence.”  Id. at 690.  Battered women often appear angry or emotional or display 
inappropriate affect (a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder); judges and evaluators may be more inclined to 
believe the calm, charming, and vehement denials of the abuser instead.  Id. at 690-92.
Judges who lack an understanding of domestic violence may have difficulty squaring the picture of the 
composed and persuasive litigant before them with the abusive father described by the battered woman.  As the 
California Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts noted in the context of child 
sexual abuse allegations, “It is much easier and more in accordance with our images of the world to regard a 
mother as crazy or hysterical than to recognize an otherwise seemingly rational and caring father as capable of 
the behaviors described.”  National Conference of State Trial Judges, supra note 155, at 124 (citations omitted).
169 Meier, id. at 686.
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it is hardly surprising that the collective stories in Battered Mothers Speak Out were 
dismissed by the Massachusetts judges.
B. Gender Bias170 Studies
Gender bias lurks in the shadows of the legal landscape confronting battered 
mothers.  The limited acknowledgment of the existence of gender bias in the courts is 
directly attributable to the work of the gender bias task forces formed in thirty-nine states 
and a number of federal circuits in the 1980s and 90s.171  Not surprisingly, one of the 
major findings of the gender bias task forces was “that state court systems are seriously 
compromised by gender bias, and most frequently and dramatically, the victims are 
women”172—particularly battered women.  Jeanette Swent summarizes the reports as 
follows: “Women receive unfavorable substantive outcomes in cases because of their 
gender, and men do not.  Women’s complaints are trivialized and their circumstances 
misconstrued more often than men’s, and women more often than men are victims of 
demeaning and openly hostile behavior in court proceedings.”173
Both the federal and state task forces found that the credibility of women litigants 
was regularly questioned.174  In the Ninth Circuit, questions about women’s credibility 
arose in the context of Social Security disability cases.  Both male and female claimant 
representatives reported that women’s disability claims were less likely to be believed 
170 While the task forces looked at bias against both men and women, “’women’ are the relevant category…in 
much of the work of the Gender Bias Task Forces.  Officially, court-based task forces embrace concerns about 
discrimination against anyone based on gender.  In practice, ‘gender-bias’ task forces inquire principally about 
and document discrimination against women in the legal system.”  Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: 
Women, Jurisdiction & the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1682, 1691 (1991).
171 Myra C. Selby, Examining Race and Gender Bias in the Courts: A Legacy of Indifference or Opportunity?, 32 
IND. L. REV. 1167, 1169-70 (1999) (providing the history of the task force movement).
172 Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1,34 (1996).  
173 Id. at 55.
174 Id. at 61-62.
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than men’s.175  Women’s claims were more often seen as “complaints about life” than 
“legally cognizable harms.” 176   New York’s task force stated, “Judges, attorneys and 
court personnel do not give as much credibility to women as to men, and perceive women 
as acting differently from men.”177  Missouri and Georgia’s task forces acknowledged the 
body of social science literature suggesting that women are perceived as less credible; 
Missouri’s report notes that male and female attorneys disagreed as to whether judges 
found male witnesses more credible than females.178
Some state reports specifically addressed credibility in the context of domestic 
violence cases.  Karen Czapanskiy notes that although every gender bias study found 
women litigants were treated as less credible than men, “[t]he problem seems particularly 
acute when the issue is a woman’s accusation that a man has been violent toward her.”179
Jeannette Swent’s analysis of the gender bias task force reports suggests that a victim of 
domestic violence may “find…her toughest adversary on the judicial bench.”180  In 
Virginia, “female family law attorneys, female prosecutors and those who provide 
services to victims of family abuse believe that judges do not know enough about the 
dynamics of family abuse” and minimize the claims of victims both in the context of 
protection order and custody cases.181  Missouri’s report documented both how victims of 
175 Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force: Executive 
Summary of the Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2153, 
2168 (1993).
176 Id. at 2173.
177 Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 129 (1986).
178 The Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 
MO. L. REV. 485, 641 (1993).   This difference in perception may be based on the different experiences of men 
and women, or on different interpretations of those experiences.  Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to 
Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2206 (1993).
179 Czapanskiy, supra note 152, at 253 -54.
180   Swent, supra note 172, at 58.
181 Gender Bias in the Courts Task Force, Gender Bias in the Courts of the Commonwealth Final Report, 7 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 705, 750-54 (2001).  More than 70% of female attorneys and almost 70% of service 
providers surveyed said that judges in Virginia handling domestic violence cases were almost never, rarely, or 
only sometimes knowledgeable about their dynamics.  Philip Trompeter, Gender Bias Task Force: Comments on 
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domestic violence felt the merits of their claims were ignored. These victims felt 
disbelieved, blamed and belittled by the questions asked by judges and the perception of 
other system actors that women were misusing the protective order process to “harass 
men or to obtain an advantage in domestic relations proceedings,” despite the absence of 
any evidence to support that contention.182  Missouri’s report admonishes, “Concern for 
system abuse should not cause judges to overlook the fact that, in a violent relationship, 
the filing of a divorce action can trigger additional violence.”183  In Maryland, the task 
force heard how a judge’s inability to connect his own experience to that of a battered 
woman led him to deny the woman a protective order despite her allegation that her 
husband had threatened her with a gun:
[The judge] took a few minutes to decide on the matter and he looked at me and 
he said, “I don’t believe anything that you’re saying…The reason I don’t believe 
it is because I don’t believe that anything like this could happen to 
me….Therefore, since I would not let that happen to me, I can’t believe that it 
happened to you.184
Family Law Issues, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2001).   The report tells the story of a woman who 
requested protection from the local magistrate, who told her, “Little girl…you don’t really want to do anything to 
your husband.  I’m not going to do anything.  I want you to just go and drive around for awhile.  He’s sure to 
cool down.”  Gender Bias in the Courts Task Force, id.at 753.
182 The Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra  note 177, at 504-06, 519-20.  The Task Force noted 
the conclusion of the Maryland Task Force Report that “[f]ar from overusing, abusing and manipulating the court 
system, women are, by and large, intimidated by the system and are under utilizing it in vast numbers.”  Id. at 
522 (citing Gender Bias in the Courts: Report of the Maryland Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the 
Courts 3 (1989)).
183 Id. at 525.
184 Gender Bias in the Courts: Report of the Maryland Special Joint Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts 2-3 
(1989).  The woman described her reaction to the experience; “to sit up in court and make myself open up and 
recount all my feelings and fear and then have it thrown back in my face as being totally untrue just because this 
big man would not allow anyone to do this to him, placed me in a state of shock which probably hasn’t left me 
yet.”  Id. See also Czapanskiy, supra note 152, at 255 (quoting a Florida lawyer who was told by a judge that he 
and his client were “overreacting”; a day later, the client’s husband tied the woman up, locked her in a room, 
threatened to kill her, and then killed himself outside her door).  While the task force reports certainly prompted 
change, recent commentators note that much progress is still needed. See text accompanying  n. 195, infra.
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Responses to the gender bias task forces were mixed.  The studies made some 
professionals uncomfortable and others angry.  As the Ninth Circuit’s Task Force on 
Gender Bias noted, 
Many men and women share a feeling that these issues are close, and 
sometimes too close for comfort.  While much of our other work at some level 
implicates one personally, questions of gender are so plainly about ourselves, 
about the construction of our lives and our relationships, that the protective veneer 
of professionalism often fades.  In practical terms, this proximity translates into a 
reticence, a nervousness, and sometimes even a hostility to approaching the issues 
raised here.185
When Karen Czapanskiy presented her study of the gender bias task forces, “a number of 
the comments fell into two categories: I don’t believe you because your numbers are 
inconsistent with my experience, or I don’t believe you because your experience is 
inconsistent with what I think the numbers are.”186
Some of the comments, however, hinged on the methodology that the studies had 
used to reach their conclusions of widespread gender bias in the courts.  The task forces 
used a variety of methods to collect data on gender bias187; collecting the narratives of 
those who had experienced gender bias (mainly women) was one of the primary methods 
used.188  Hearing the women’s stories helped task force members to understand the 
challenges women faced in engaging the courts and enhanced the credibility of the 
185 Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, supra note 175, at 2175.
186 Czapanskiy, supra note 152, at 248.
187 As Barbara Babcock noted, “The mixture of quantitative data and experiential testimony that has been a 
fixture of task force reports is the lawyer’s form of consciousness-raising, the recounting of individual stories is 
the paradigmatic feminist method.”  Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic 
and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2143, 2148 (1993).
188 Some questioned the use of narratives not because of their reliability, but because of the strain placed on those 
testifying.  The Honorable Philip Trumpeter wrote, “I recall a woman who was scheduled to speak at the public 
hearing in Roanoke, but because she was so intimidated by the tone of the participants, mostly fathers who were 
very strident at that hearing, she did not testify.  She testified a few days later, traveling a good distance to a 
hearing in Abingdon, in which I participated.  She delayed her testimony because she just did not feel 
comfortable.  I simply do not feel that any adult should be expected to bear his or her soul or suffer 
embarrassment by speaking about a highly personal and possibly traumatic life experience in front of a group of 
strangers….although I support the methodology and I would not have changed it, I did not feel that the public 
hearings were beneficial in this area.”  Trompeter, supra note 181, at 1094.  But see Massoud, supra note 5, at 
30-32 (arguing that women are empowered by the opportunity to tell their stories publicly).
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victims.189  And while “a particular story might be unverifiable, masses of consistent 
testimony gathered from a variety of sources and using various research methods 
persuaded members that gender bias did infect the courts.”190  The task forces debated 
how to present their findings.  Early task forces worried that their conclusions and 
recommendations could not be sufficiently bolstered by the stories of women alleging 
gender bias; later task forces relied more heavily on the voices of those who testified to 
give their reports “life” and “passion.”191  Such attention to information gathering 
techniques and presentation did not impress everyone, however.  Applauding a decision 
to deny further federal funding to gender bias studies, Senator Orrin Hatch called the 
studies “ill-conceived, deeply flawed and divisive…methodologically biased and 
flawed”192—ironically, the same charges leveled against Battered Mothers Speak Out.
Massachusetts’ task force made findings similar to those of other states.  The 
Gender Bias Study Committee “found gender bias to be in operation when decisions 
made or actions taken were based on preconceived or stereotypical notions about the 
nature, role or capacity of men and women.  We observed the effect of myths and 
misconceptions about the economic and social realities of men’s and women’s lives and 
about the relative value of their work.”193  Specifically, the study found that “female 
litigants…are faced with unnecessary and unacceptable obstacles that can be explained 
only in terms of their gender.”194  Such gender-biased treatment of female litigants 
“undermines credibility and confidence and thereby places unwarranted burdens” on 
189 Swent, supra note 172, at 46.
190 Id. at 47.  
191 Id. at 63-64.
192 141 Cong. Rec. S14691-92 (September 29, 1995) (quoted in Swent, id. at 84.)
193 Gender Bias Study Committee, Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 745 (1990).
194 Id. at 758.
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them.195  The gender bias in the Massachusetts courts “weaken[s] female litigants’ 
testimony.  When women…are denied credibility because of their gender, the courts are 
seriously impaired in their ability to deliver justice to anyone in our society.”196  The 
issue of credibility was of particular concern in the context of domestic violence.  The 
Gender Bias Study Committee explained, “The tendency to doubt the testimony of 
domestic violence victims and to ‘blame’ them for their predicament not only hampers 
the court’s ability to provide victims with the protection they deserve, it also has a 
chilling effect on victims’ willingness to seek relief.”197  A sizeable number of judges 
believed that female victims were deemed less credible in cases of domestic violence and 
sexual assault.198  The Committee found that victims were asked what they had done to 
deserve the abuse, why they were seeking protection in the absence of physical injuries, 
why they waited to seek relief from the courts, and why they were bothering the courts 
with their problems.199  The study also found that judges and family service officers were 
not adequately considering violence against women in making custody decisions200, and 
that a majority of judges believed that “mothers allege child sexual abuse to gain a 
195 Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Report of the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, 23 
SUFFOLK. UNIV. L. REV. 575, 635 (1989).  
196 Gender Bias Study Committee, supra  note 193, at 758.  The study found that 14% of judges, 20% of counsel 
and 14% of court employees had observed the statements of female victims, litigants or witnesses being given 
less weight than those of similarly situated men.  Supreme Court of Massachusetts, supra note 195, at 669.
197   Supreme Court of Massachusetts, supra note 195, at 585-86.  One Massachusetts judge, who subsequently 
retired, unabashedly told the press that he doubted the credibility of women who filed for protective orders.  Id. 
at 594.  Another yelled at women seeking restraining orders, “You are worse than my wife,” and refused to allow 
female victims to fully testify, making decisions without hearing their stories.  Id. at 662.
198 Id. at 670.  A smaller number of judges responded that women’s testimony is given less credibility than 
men’s regardless of the type of case.  Id.
199 Id. at 602.
200 Id. at 599.  The Committee recommended the passage of legislation to “provide guidance to the probate 
courts on how to consider the existence of serious or repeated spousal abuse when making orders for the custody 
and visitation of children.”  Id.  Massachusetts subsequently enacted such legislation, but how effective that 
legislation has been in Massachusetts or the other states that have adopted it is subject to debate. See Leigh 
Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do For Children in Family Violence 
Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 254-75 (1999); see generally Nancy K.D. Lemon, Statutes Creating Rebuttable 
Presumptions Against Custody to Batterers: How Effective Are They?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601 (2001).
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bargaining advantage in the divorce process.”201  The study made a number of 
recommendations to address these findings of bias against women in the Massachusetts 
courts.
The Massachusetts Committee for Gender Equality, charged with implementing 
the task force recommendations, created a widely praised eight-page brochure containing 
rules for avoiding gender bias.  But as Jeannette Swent notes, the simplicity of the 
product “is also its downfall.  While the pamphlet may reduce the number of ‘honey’ 
stories, it will not produce meaningful insight into how gender bias works.  Neither will it 
discourage anything more subtle than a pat on the fanny in open court.”202  The stories of 
the women in Battered Mothers Speak Out bear out Swent’s prediction.
While some progress has been made since the gender bias task force reports were 
issued, a follow-up study in Maryland revealed that “no group perceives gender…bias as 
non-existent or even close to non-existent….Gender problems persist in the treatment of 
domestic violence victims and the application of laws.”203 Battered Mothers Speak Out
verifies that the gender bias identified by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 
1990 continues to exist in Massachusetts as well, particularly for battered mothers 
seeking custody of their children.  In the face of gender bias, questions about women’s 
credibility, and the legacy of skepticism about battered women’s claims, it is hardly 
surprising that the narratives contained in the report failed to sway state actors in 
Massachusetts.  Given the difficulties in making battered women’s stories audible to 
decisionmakers, should the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out have chosen a 
201 Gender Bias Study Committee, supra note 193, at 842-43.
202   Swent, supra note 172, at 74.
203 Janet Stidman Eveleth, Strides in Gender Equality, MARYLAND BAR J., January/February 2002, at 52-53.
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different method to document the human rights abuses they found?  The next section 
considers that question.
V.  Who (or What) Should Tell the Story?
The credibility of women, particularly battered women, in the courts is so 
compromised that using the narratives of battered women to convince state actors that 
change in the courts is needed may be a futile endeavor.  How, then, can those seeking 
change convince those in power that change is needed?  Should battered women’s stories 
be told in the third person, rather than the first?  Should the experiences of battered 
women be conveyed by statistics, rather than words?  Both of those approaches are 
considered below.
A.  Third Person Narratives:  Court Watch
One method that investigators working on Battered Mothers Speak Out used to 
verify the claims of their subjects was to attend hearings with the battered mothers and 
document what they saw and heard.  Volunteers and professionals in a number of states 
have performed similar services through court monitoring projects.  Court monitoring, or 
court watch, programs “help the system reach its potential by identifying flaws, 
recommending solutions, and advocating for change” based on the cases that court 
monitors observe.204   Court watch programs also help communities enhance their 
understanding of the court process.  As one court watch participant explains, 
The courts exist on behalf of the community, but the community is not educated 
enough to know what is going on, nor are they in a position to be able to tell the courts 
what they think they ought to be doing….[O]ur calling is to be able to bring back to the 
204 WATCH, Developing a Court Monitoring Program, at http://www.watchmn.org/pdfs/order-form.pdf; see also
Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, Community Court Watch II: A Study of Bergen County 
Family Court System and the Enforcement of the State of New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 17 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 79, 82 (1995) (explaining that “Above all things, the Community Court Watch Project 
is an instrument of change.  Observation, recommendation and action have been blended together to impact 
positively the way in which domestic violence cases are addressed in court.”)
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community as a whole, anecdotal information; here is what is happening in the courts, 
these are the kinds of sentences that people are getting, this is the way judges are treating 
victims, this is the way judges are treating perpetrators.205
When state actors are skeptical about reports coming from those who use the courts, “a 
‘court watch’ program may provide the necessary documentation of dubious behavior” 
and provide judges with an impetus to change their ways.206  Court watch programs can 
also help to dispel myths about the way litigants use the court process.207
Judges are acutely aware of the scrutiny of those who report on the proceedings in 
their courtrooms.208  In one infamous Maryland domestic violence case, the judge noted 
that “because no one was present from the victim’s family or a victim’s advocacy group, 
he could sentence ‘in anonymity.’”209  He also alluded to the influence that Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving has had in pressuring judges to sentence drunk drivers 
severely.210  His comments imply that had someone been watching him when he 
considered the case of a man who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter for shooting his 
wife in the head with a hunting rifle after finding her with another man, the sentence 
might have been more severe than eighteen months of work release and fifty hours of 
community service.211  The judge might also have refrained from referring to the man as 
205 Symposium, Panel Discussion, Morning Session, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 455 (2003)(comments of Pam 
Wiseman, Executive Director, Safe Passage Shelter, DeKalb, Illinois).
206 Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law: An Impassioned Exploration for Family Peace, 33 FAM. L. 
Q. 719, 739 (1999) (describing the success of a court watch conducted by women in a small fishing village in 
Alaska after a judge refused to take abuse against one woman’s granddaughter seriously); see also System 
Shouldn’t Victimize Battered Too, LANSING ST. J., May 20, 2004, at A15 (describing how Ingraham County’s 
court watch program has increased awareness of legal system actors).
207 See Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 204, at 83, 87 (arguing that court watch 
findings that only 11-16% of women seeking protective orders had pending divorces dispelled myth that women 
used protective order process to bolster settlements and custody claims in divorces).
208 Court watch programs may also be unpopular with judges who perceive that court watchers are “’out to get’ 
them.”  Paige Akin, Keeping Watch Over Judges: Program Aims to Protect Abuse Victims, But Some Fear It Will 
Disrupt Courts, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, September 13, 2004, at A-1.
209 Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1079 (1995) (discussing 
State v. Peacock, 94-CR-0943, 1994).
210 Id. at 1064.
211 Id.
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a “noncriminal” and speculating that most married men would have inflicted some 
“corporal punishment” in that situation.212  After a group of grandmothers in Alaska sat 
in court for a few days to watch a judge handling domestic violence cases, the judge 
asked the women what they wanted; they told him exactly what he needed to do 
differently to comply with state law.   Within six months, the court had changed its 
practices, a change the women reinforced with occasional return visits.213
Why might the results reported from court watch programs be more credible than 
the first person narratives of the women who use court systems?  Court watch programs 
use “objective” volunteers who have no stake in the proceedings214, although many 
participate specifically because they have concerns about how justice is being 
administered.215  Court watchers may be able to articulate concerns about the treatment of 
battered women, concerns which, coming from battered women, would be easy to 
dismiss as self-serving.216  The reports of court watchers are imbued with a credibility 
that first person accounts from battered women seem to lack, answering the claims of 
bias leveled at the narratives battered mothers tell of their interactions with the family 
court system.
B. “Objective” Reports on Family Courts
212 Id.
213 Buel, supra note 206, at 739-40.
214 A study of Bergen County, New Jersey’s Court Watch II raised concerns about “solicitousness on the part of 
the judges….However, monitors did express confidence in their ability to remain objective and generate valid 
findings.”  Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 204, at 90.
215 One court watch organization focusing its efforts on cases involving violence against children and women 
describes its volunteers as follows:  “WATCH volunteers are civic-minded people who come from a wide variety 
of backgrounds,” who are “motivated by their concern for the safety and welfare of abused and neglected 
children in our community….”  Rebecca Kutty, WATCH’s Monitoring of Open CHIPS Cases in Hennepin 
County Juvenile Court 1 (2001).  In Richmond, Virginia, one defense attorney noted a concern that a court watch 
program was “really an advocacy group in disguise,” noting the large red buttons reading “Safe at Home” that 
court watch volunteers wear in the courtroom.  Akin, supra note 208, at A-1.
216   WATCH documented how a victim seeking a protective order was interrogated about why she remained 
with her batterer, while the batterer was largely ignored. Kutty, id. at ch.6.  If the victim had articulated her 
discomfort with these questions, she might easily have been told that the questions were appropriate, and her 
concerns about the judge’s demeanor—and its effect on her--dismissed.
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Conveying the experiences of battered mothers through numbers rather than 
words is another option.  Although quantitative research is subject to some of the same 
criticisms about objectivity and bias as qualitative research, policymakers and state actors 
nonetheless might accept statistical information about problems with the court process
that they refuse to hear when conveyed in narrative form.
A recent study of the Philadelphia family courts supports this hypothesis.  Justice 
in the Domestic Relations Division of Philadelphia Family Court: A Report to the 
Community details the challenges faced by families who seek the assistance of the 
Philadelphia Family Court to address their family crises.  The study, written by 
Philadelphia’s Women’s Law Project (WLP), was created in response to the numerous 
accounts received by the Project “from women who have had difficulties navigating the 
domestic relations judicial process and negative experiences trying to present their 
cases.”217
The Women’s Law Project’s report is self-consciously quantitative; as they began 
their work, “we recognized the necessity of using objective standards to guide both the 
collection and evaluation of the information about the Court.”218  The central component 
of this quantitative study was a court observation project.  The WLP developed two 
survey instruments, one for use in custody cases and one for protection from abuse cases 
and “developed the forms to be neutral and objective, particularly because our other 
sources of information were more subjective in nature.”219  Using those tools, volunteers 
collected data in various courtrooms; the data was later entered into a computer system 
217 Women’s Law Project, Justice in the Domestic Relations Division of Philadelphia Family Court: A Report to 
the Community 2 (2003).
218 Id. at 17.
219 Id. at Appendix A-1.
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and analyzed for reliability by testing the correlations between the reports of primary and 
secondary observers.220  The courtroom reports were supplemented by the narrative 
accounts of volunteer telephone counselors and courtroom observers, surveys of callers to 
the Women’s Law Project Telephone Counseling Service, test calls to the Customer 
Service Unit of the Domestic Relations Division and a review of court materials.221
While the Women’s Law Project collected the narratives of individual litigants using a 
variety of tools, that information was generally presented in collective, numerical form.  
The “experience” of using the Domestic Relations Division is presented “from the 
consumer’s perspective,”222 but not in the consumers’ own words.
The reception the Philadelphia report received could not have been more different 
than the response to Battered Mothers Speak Out.  Although the report found a number of 
pervasive problems with the Domestic Relations Division that threatened the quality of 
justice afforded litigants, and questioned whether, given “[t]he prevalence of women as 
petitioners in family law matters…gender bias contributes to the Court’s low prestige and 
insufficient resources,”223 there was no public outcry.  Instead, “[t]he domestic relations 
division issued a written thanks to the WLP after the report was released”224 and the 
Board of Governors of the Philadelphia Bar Association adopted a resolution detailing 
the report’s findings and pledging its support to “improving the delivery of justice in the 
220 Id. at Appendix A-2.
221 Id. at Appendix A-3—A-5.
222 Id. at 38.
223 Id. at 5.
224 Jennifer Batchelor, Domestic Relations Division Overburdened, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2003 at 
1.
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Domestic Relations Division….”225  The study also spurred Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Newman to seek a new building for the Domestic Relations Division.226
What accounts for this difference?   While it could be any number of different 
factors, the depersonalization of the information provided in the report is one possibility 
to consider.  Instead of confronting the court with the names and first person accounts of 
aggrieved women, the Philadelphia report offers numbers and statistics to reach a 
conclusion remarkably similar to the one reached in Battered Mothers Speak Out.  Opting 
for a quantitative report may have made those conclusions easier to hear and spurred the 
local legal establishment to action to relieve the conditions documented in the report.227
A California group working on its own Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project certainly 
seems to share that belief.  Instead of soliciting the stories of affected women, the 
California Protective Parents Association is randomly reviewing 270 files in custody 
cases involving domestic violence for its replication of the Battered Mothers’ Testimony 
Project.  Researcher Linda Bernard explains, “We wanted to avoid the methodological 
criticisms of projects such as the [Massachusetts] BMTP and others that it’s a biased 
225 Board of Governors, Philadelphia Bar Association, Resolution on Improving the Delivery of Justice in the 
Domestic Relations Division of Philadelphia Family Court, July 24, 2003.
226 See generally Jill Porter, At last! New digs eyed for Family Court, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, January 30, 
2004, at http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/7831944.htm.
227 Not all quantitative reports of women’s interactions with the courts are persuasive to state actors, 
however.  When quantitative reports have a distinctly feminist agenda, they are received in much the same 
way that BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT was.  The Arizona Battered Mothers Testimony Project relies far 
more heavily on quantitative data than the Massachusetts report.  But, as author Diane Post noted,
“So far the report has been met with resounding silence.  The major media that we worked with for a year to do 
the story pulled it the day before it was to run, allegedly from judicial pressure.  The governmental committees 
that are to consider such policy issues give it five minutes, or, after the presentation, have no comments and go 
immediately to the next agenda item.  The primary author has been vilified and the report denigrated.”  Diane 
Post, Arizona Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project: A Human Rights Approach to Child Custody and Domestic 
Violence, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, December/January 2004, at 29.
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sample….”228  The California project is committed, however, to maintaining the human 
rights focus.229
C. Why Are Narratives So Important?
Given the obstacles created by the use of narratives, and the existence of other 
ways of presenting evidence in support of court reform, why should advocates continue 
to collect and disseminate the narratives of those affected by problems with the family 
courts?  
Collecting narratives, particularly in the context of a human rights investigation, 
gives battered women an opportunity to share their experiences and have their stories 
validated.  As one BMTP participant explained, “Just to have someone believe my story 
literally saved my life.”230
Using narratives to highlight systemic problems can give courts and state actors 
the opportunity to develop empathetic understanding of the problems faced by litigants in 
the family court.  Hearing narratives helped Maryland’s legislators to understand the 
problems confronted by battered women seeking protective orders and led directly to 
reform of the state’s domestic violence laws.  Jane Murphy describes the impact of the 
women’s testimony: 
Ultimately, this is a story about domestic violence victims and their advocates, 
who forced decision-makers to listen after decades of inattention to the problem. 
They listened, not only to the experts, and not only to the statistical and fiscal 
impact testimony-they listened to the stories of the women and children who have 
been devastated by the legal system's historical tolerance of violence in the 
home.231
228 Slote, supra note 10, at 6.
229 Id.
230 Slote, supra note 10, at 2; see also Massoud, supra  note 5, at 31.
231 Murphy, supra note 9, at 1293.  This quote also points to the power of combining narrative with other types of
evidence.
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Courts and state actors can distance themselves from problems described by 
numbers or impartial observers far more easily than they can from the individual 
accounts of experiences in their courtrooms.232
Finally, abandoning the use of narratives in favor of more “objective” evidence 
tacitly accepts the premise that women are not credible, and in so doing, further 
undermines women’s credibility.  Because we believe that courts and state actors won’t 
believe women’s stories, we choose not to tell them.  By making that choice, we deprive 
those entities of the chance to examine or to change their opinions about women’s 
credibility.  We can never hope to change the perception that battered women are not 
credible if we stop offering those who we seek to persuade an opportunity to see these 
women in a different light.
VI.  Conclusion
Over two years have passed since Battered Mothers Speak Out was first issued 
and little has changed in the Massachusetts family courts.  The work of the Battered 
Mothers’ Testimony Project has been slowed by a lack of funding.  And yet, week after 
week, battered mothers call the project to tell their stories: stories of discrimination, 
humiliation and (the Project would argue) human rights abuses perpetrated by judges and 
other state actors in the Massachusetts family court system.  If only judges could hear 
these stories—without the pretext of “junk science” or the blinders of gender bias—
perhaps the family courts could better protect the battered women and children who seek 
their assistance. 
232 This analysis begs the question of whether judges really care about the problems articulated by those using the 
system.  Is satisfaction of litigants part of their mission?  Are other issues more important to the judges?  Mark 
Massoud’s study of the Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project suggests that even as they publicly dismissed the 
mothers’ claims, the judges did care about the issues raised by the report.  Massoud, supra note 5, at 29.
